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PREFACE 
Stream ciphers are cryptographic primitives used to ensure privacy in digital secure 
communication. However, they are attractive because of their simplicity and are used in 
many cryptographic applications. In this thesis, we focus on stream ciphers built using 
linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and feedback carry shift registers (FCSRs). 
Several different complex code generators are designed for stream ciphers. 
Linear feedback shift registers, very familiar to electrical engineers and coding 
theorists, are suited for high speed implementations, since they are easily implemented in 
both hardware and software. So, we have used LFSRs to generate complex codes for 
stream ciphers. 
In general, LFSR based stream ciphers are vulnerable to various versions of the 
correlation attack. Therefore, various schemes are reported in literature to generate 
complex codes to provide more security to the messages. In this thesis, new simple 
circuits are also studied and developed to provide more security using LFSRs and FCSRs. 
For encryption, the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is initialized with a key 
and provides its output as a sequence of bits known as the (pseudo) random keystream. 
Randomness is very important because it destroys any statistical properties in the 
message. So complications have been added to the keystream generators. Some 
generators have LFSRs clocked at different rates; sometimes the clocking of one 
generator depends on the output of another. Simple LFSRs generate PN sequences 
depending upon the feedback taping and are very simple for hardware implementation. 
However, they are not considered for stream enciphering because the secrecy obtained 
through them is poor. Various circuits are designed which utilize more than one LFSR of 
same or different lengths, Gold code generators and FCSRs to generate complex codes. 
Geffe generator is simple for hardware implementation but it is cryptographically 
weak and falls to a correlation attack. A modified Geffe generator is designed for the 
generation of relatively complex and lengthy keystreams. In LFSR, different feedback 
sequences are possible to generate different m-sequences. This characteristic is utilized to 
generate lengthy and complex sequences through Gold codes. Other circuits developed 
utilize the multiple feedback possibilities in a single LFSR to generate lengthy and 
complex codes. For electronic control of feedback sequences, programmable logic arrays 
(PLAs) are used. The input control bits of the PLAs are changed pseudo randomly for a 
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pseudorandom feedback selection to increase the complexity of the codes thus generated. 
The circuits designed are subjected to randomness tests and many results are found 
successful. Some of the circuits are hardware implemented and others are studied using 
Simulink in MATLAB. 
Synchronous and asynchronous stream encryption/decryption is implemented for 
single as well as muhichannel systems. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Secure communication is essential for the exploitation of mobile communication and the 
Internet to its full potential, for the transfer of sensitive data in, payment systems, 
e-commerce, m-commerce, health systems, financial transactions, oil and gas exploration 
monitoring, control system communications, freedom of speech, free discussion of ideas 
and privacy, military systems, research and development (R&D) and in numerous other 
applications. Cryptography allows people to carry over the confidence found in the 
physical world to the electronic world. It allows people to do business electronically 
without worries of deceit and deception. When people started doing business online and 
they needed to transfer funds electronically, the applications of cryptography for integrity 
began to surpass its use for secrecy. Hundreds of thousands of people interact 
electronically every day, whether it is through e-mail, e-commerce, ATM machines, or 
cellular phones. The constant increase of information transmitted electronically has lead 
to an increased reliance on cryptography. It is important that a nation implements its own 
cryptography in military systems as it has become apparent that cryptographic material 
imported from another country is likely to be rigged in such a way that it can be broken. 
There are many areas discussed above, which have shown an interest in 
communication privacy, and in recent times, these areas have largely driven research into 
cryptography as a means of protecting information in transit [1.1-1.10]. So, we need to 
proceed with the serious study and development of cost effective cryptographic 
techniques for commercial applications [1.11]. 
1.2 Literature Survey 
The science of secret communication namely cryptology is an important area of research. 
It has come up as a multidisciplinary subject including Mathematics, Electronics, 
Communication and Computer Science. With advancements in computers and 
communication technologies, many systems have turned digital. The need for protection 
of stored and transmitted information by corporate and government agencies has brought 
this subject into the public domain in addition to the traditional domains of military and 
government sectors, In the last three decades, the technical developments in this area have 
grown manifolds. An account of developments in this field including a brief history, some 
recent advances, certain important applications and a few future trends are discussed in 
refs. [1.1, 1.6, 1.9-1.25]. Fundamental ideas, importance and basic properties of 
cryptography have been discussed in articles [1.18, 1.25-1.26]. 
A large number of research papers on cryptographic techniques have been published 
during the last decades. Formally they can be divided in two main classes. The one deals 
with the block ciphers and the other deals with the stream ciphers. The stream ciphers 
have been discussed in refs. [1.27-1.35]. The reference [1.30] is merely a collection of 
ideas and an incentive for further discussions. General considerations for evaluating the 
quality of a cryptographic implementation, with a strong focus on hardware 
implementation of stream ciphers have been discussed by S. Kumar et al. [1.28]. In 
particular, the features area efficiency, power, and secure implementation are discussed. 
Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security (AEGIS), a 
methodology for the development of secure and usable systems is described in ref [1.36]. 
A scheme for secure digital mobile communications is proposed by T. Hwang [1.37]. 
In this scheme, user authentications as well as key distribution is provided 
simultaneously. Due to the use of symmetric key cryptosystems, the scheme can be easily 
implemented with hardware-limited terminals. Conversion functions for symmetric key 
ciphers are given in ref. [1.38]. 
Cost effective simpler systems for secure and reliable communications are reported 
for commercial applications using spread spectrum techniques and cryptographic 
techniques [1.20, 1.31, 1.39]. 
A simple and novel circuit for the generation of a Time Hopping Spread Spectrum 
(THSS) signal corresponding to an input message bit sequence is presented in ref. [1.40]. 
The circuit has been modified to generate an encrypted THSS signal with increased 
message-hiding capacity. The novel circuits for multiplexing various THSS signals are 
also worked out. The experimental investigation of the circuit has yielded satisfactory 
results. The receiver circuits to recover the message signals from various THSS signals 
have also been proposed. 
For spread spectrum as well as cryptographic techniques linear feedback shift 
registers (LFSRs) are the basic circuit used for the generation of random sequences. 
Maximal length sequences have good statistical properties and can be used for the 
generation of more complex sequences. Therefore, the feedback connections for m-
sequences are important. Algorithmic procedures for testing the feedback connections of 
an LFSR to check whether the design may generate maximal length sequences (m-
sequence) or not have been discussed by A. Ahmad et al. [1.41]. Since for an n-bit LFSR 
the algorithm only requires an (n-l)-bit register operation throughout its entire 
implementation, thus it requires minimal CPU time as well as memory space. Therefore, 
the attribute of the developed algorithm is two folded. The first, it is the fastest available 
algorithm and secondly, it is not posing the restriction on the length of the LFSRs like 
other existing methods. The simulation result of the algorithm is compared with the 
results of existing algorithms and found much faster than the other existing algorithms. 
The implementation procedure of the algorithm is demonstrated through an elaborative 
example. 
A novel keystream generator using pseudorandom binary sequences (PRBS) with 
irregular clocking that is based on the A5/1 stream cipher, which is used to secure GSM 
conversations, has been described by D. Horan et al. [1.42]. An improvement in security 
is obtained by introducing dynamic polynomial switching in the liner feedback shift 
registers, present in the architecture for pseudo noise sequence generation. A basic 
security analysis shows that this introduction increases the stream cipher's resistance to 
cryptanalysis. Statistical tests are applied to the keystream in compliance with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Diehard test suites in order to 
ensure the quality of bit stream produced by the generator. 
Statistical parameters of the sequences, generated by FCSR component, have been 
investigated by V. P. Shyrochin et al. [1.43]. The statistical investigation of 8-bit and 9-
bit FCSR components has been done. The analysis showed that obtained sequences has 
higher period, but in the same time some of the sequences have not passed statistical tests. 
So for real world application, it is advised to use the combination of LFSR and FCSR 
components to develop the advanced quasi-random generators (QRG). 
Scramblers are a simple and effective means of making digital data communications 
secure. A novel method for scrambling the data is presented in ref. [1.44]. It need not use 
large numbers of shift register stages, yet it makes unscrambling very difficult for 
hackers. 
Wireless systems based on CDMA utilize pseudorandom number sequences for 
generation of the spreading codes. These sequences are usually created by the use of 
finite field arithmetic. A pure software implementation onto a digital signal processor 
(DSP) is very inefficient and would result in unreasonable high computational load. A 
hardware based scheme is proposed by U. Walther et al. [1.45] which allows for an 
efficient implementation on a high performance DSP as well as into an ASIC. With the 
configurable approach a binary PN (pseudorandom noise) sequence with an arbitrary 
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primitive polynomial can be generated. In this paper a special LFSR-based PN sequence 
generator is designed. The main blocks of the proposed LFSR-based PN sequence 
generator are the logic for shifter and masks and the 4-configuration registers. The 
register based design allows the construction of sequences with arbitrary polynomials and 
phase shifts. 
The new applications have created new problems in communication systems. Many 
times, these systems demand high-speed and low hardware complexity. In wired 
applications, these systems usually have to operate with high speed. In wireless 
applications, mobile phones for instance, the system requires low hardware resources. In 
all cases, the most critical parameter is the security that the encryption algorithms provide 
and is used by the communication systems [1.39]. The increase in mobility necessitates 
the scientists to design new encryption algorithms with special care in speed, security and 
simplicity. The simplicity of the algorithms design is not a major factor in software 
implementation but in hardware implementation it might be quite important. The 
hardware implementations of today's algorithms are inefficient for devices with limited 
hardware area. So, stream ciphers are used in cases where a low hardware complexity is 
necessitated. The stream ciphers are intended to have low complexity in hardware, while 
providing a moderate level of security [1.33]. 
In the paper [1.46], the hardware implementations of five representative stream 
ciphers are compared in terms of performance and consumed area. The ciphers used for 
the comparison are the A5/I, W7, EO, RC4 and Helix. 
Stream ciphering devices seem to be one of the best alternatives in order to provide 
confidentiality to high-speed transmissions. Several indices on the security of stream 
ciphers have been proposed for guaranteeing their strength. According to the literature, 
the linear complexity of the key stream, randomness and correlation-immune attacks are 
of great importance. But the proposed indices are not sufficient to guarantee the security 
of stream ciphers. It is possible that sequences with a high linear complexity have a very 
bad "linear complexity stability", i.e., after changing a few bits of the original sequence, 
its linear complexity decreases or increases fast. In this case, a BAA (best affine 
approximation) attack could be very successful; the sequences may be very well 
approximated by another one with very much lower linear unpredictability. This problem 
is especially important when linear feedback shift registers are used. To solve this 
problem, nonlinear next state functions are a possible solution. The paper [1.47] shows 
stream ciphering alternatives based on nonlinear feedback shift registers (NLFSR), and 
some techniques for their analysis. Finally, authors compare a structure based on NLFSR 
with the best known stream ciphering schemes. 
For the encryption of multiple channels of communications, different codes need to be 
generated in parallel to support multiple users at the same time. It is not advisable to 
implement code generating circuits directly, but to design a flexible architecture which is 
able to deliver all codes. Idea for the parallel Gold code generator, given in section 4.6, is 
based on schemes discussed in refs. [1.45, 1.48]. These papers have presented certain 
schemes for the generation of parallel codes to be used in multichannel communication 
systems. A new circuit based on Gold code generator is presented in section 5.5 of the 
thesis and is found to be simpler for hardware implementation. 
Problems in designing a cryptosystem: security, fast stream enciphering/deciphering, 
and error propagation persistence in channels including mobile communications have 
been focused in ref. [1.49]. As a result, a parallel stream cipher is proposed that combines 
the strengths of stream and block ciphers, that is, the security and freedom from error 
propagation of a stream cipher and the parallel processing ability of a block cipher. H. 
Lee and S. Moon [1.50] propose a parallel-structuredZ-shifting LFSR (PS-LFSR) with an 
m(>2)-times faster shifting during one clock interval and a parallel stream cipher that is 
faster by paralleling many similar keystream generators using the PS-LFSRs. Circuit 
details are explained with an example of m-parallel summation generator (called m-
parallel SUM-BSG) with 8-bit parallel outputs. It is claimed that the proposed cipher 
exhibits the crypto degree of conventional stream ciphers with m-times faster processing. 
Multiple cipher hardware algorithms are run in parallel over an input stream. For 
example, one algorithm can process the input stream using an old cipher key while a 
parallel algorithm processes the input stream using the current cipher key. Alternatively, 
multiple cipher operations can be performed in parallel enabling a receiver to determine 
which cipher algorithm was employed in encrypting a data packet [1.51]. 
Various works have been carried out by different researchers in the field of complex 
code generators for improvement of the complexity of the codes and hence the degree of 
secrecy. Many techniques have been reported to establish parallel stream ciphers and new 
complex codes in refs. [1.45, 1.48-1.51]. 
Programmable code generator for software defined radio has been discussed in ref 
[1.48]. It describes a flexible processor capable to produce codes for various standards 
such as UMTS and 802.11. Most codes can be realized using LFSR and Gold codes. In 
base stations, many such codes need to be generated in parallel to support multiple users 
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at the same time. It is not advisable to implement code generating circuits directly, but to 
design a flexible architecture which is able to deliver all codes. This paper reviews a 
flexible architecture to generate codes in a direct architecture. Subsequently, a novel 
processor architecture specialized on code generation is proposed. 
A programmable multiple-sequence generation scheme, which is constructed from a 
two dimension-like feedback shift register structure, to generate a set of deterministic 
sequence of vectors followed by pseudo-random vectors is presented in ref. [1.52]. A 
sequence segmentation method is employed to handle a long sequence of vectors. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The main focus of this thesis is the multichannel stream enciphering using complex 
codes generated through linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and feedback with carry 
shift registers (FCSRs). 
Linear feedback shift registers are suited for high speed implementations, since they 
are easily implemented in both hardware and software. Therefore, in this thesis LFSRs 
are used to generate complex codes for stream ciphers. New and simple circuits are also 
studied and implemented to provide more security using LFSRs. Few circuits using FCSR 
along with LFSRs are also included. Various complex code generators are designed and 
studied for stream ciphers. 
Stream cipher designs are based on pseudorandom sequence generators. Simple 
LFSRs generate PN sequences depending upon the feedback taping and are very simple 
for hardware implementation. However, they are not considered for stream enciphering 
because the secrecy obtained through them is poor. Some improvements are proposed to 
increase the secrecy even with simple LFSRs. The length of the sequences are also 
increased many folds as compared to these obtained using simple LFSRs. Various circuits 
are designed and reported in this thesis which utilize more than one LFSR of same or 
different lengths, Gold code generators and FCSRs to generate complex codes. A 
modified Geffe generator and clock control Geffe generator is designed for the generation 
of relatively complex and lengthy keystreams. Some complex code generator circuits are 
also presented using LFSRs and programmable logic arrays (PLAs). Proposed PLA based 
complex code generator circuit can be taken as a Generic PN sequence generator with 
electronically controlled sequence generation. A novel self synchronizing stream cipher 
technique based on Gold codes, has been developed which is suitable for encryption of 
different channels in parallel. This stream cipher technique not only reduces hardware 
complexity but also increases the complexity of the keystream. 
The organization of the subsequent chapters of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of the cryptography. The concept of 
encryption/decryption with single key as well as with two different tceys and types of 
cryptographic algorithms are discussed in detail. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the central topic of this work, the stream ciphers and their 
components. Since most of the considered ciphers are based on LFSRs, some of their 
properties and the advantages/disadvantages of using them in the designs are also 
included. Because of the linear property of the LFSRs, Gold codes and other complex 
codes are introduced to the stream ciphers. A brief introduction and some important 
points about the FCSR are discussed. A few circuits using FCSR and LFSRs to generate 
complex codes are also included in this chapter. 
In Chapter 4 various novel complex code generator circuits are designed for the 
synchronous and asynchronous stream encryption/decryption using LFSRs, Gold codes 
and FCSRs. Further, LFSRs, FCSRs and Gold code based modified Geffe generators, 
clock control Geffe generator, and PLAs based circuits are proposed. In this chapter, 
parallel codes for the encryption of time division multiplexed signals are also discussed. 
In Chapter 5 various novel schemes for single and multichannel stream ciphers are 
designed. These are based on the complex code generators presented in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 6, the results of various circuits developed are presented and discussed. In 
section 6.1 to 6.6 various experimental and simulation results of complex code generators 
and related encryption/decryption schemes are presented. They also include the results of 
encryption/decryption with single as well as multichannel stream ciphers. Section 6.7 
presents the randomness test results conducted on the various schemes. 
Finally, summary and concluding remarks are made in Chapter 7. Some ideas for 
future work in this field are also suggested. Four appendices (Appendices A, B, C and D) 
are given at the end of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Message Security in Communication Systems using 
Cryptography 
2.1 Introduction 
Communications play an important role and contributed to the growth of technologies. 
Electronic security is increasingly involved in making communication more prevalent. 
Therefore, a mechanism is needed to assure the security and privacy of information that is 
sent over the electronic communications media. Whether the communication media is 
wired or wireless, both cannot be protected from unauthorized reception or interception of 
transmission [2.1-2.2]. 
Message security is the science and study of methods for protecting message signals 
from unauthorized disclosure and modification. The message signals include digital data 
from computers and other communication systems, as well as analog messages including 
audio, video and other instrumentation signals [2.1]. 
Cryptography provides the tools to secure sensitive information. It is an exciting field 
of knowledge that deals with secure transmission of data on public channels. 
Cryptographic techniques are particularly important and indispensable components of the 
electronic governance because these techniques not only provide information 
confidentiality and prevent information falsification, but also assure electronic 
authentication [2.3-2.4]. Cryptography is very important where personal information is 
stored on computers and transmitted over computer networks [2.2]. At the same time 
cryptography has a tremendous potential to enrich mathematics education and some 
encryption algorithms used in cryptography have basic mathematical concepts. 
Cryptography is difficult too and it combines mathematics, computer science, sometimes 
electrical engineering, and a twisted mindset that can figure out how to get around rules, 
break systems and subvert the designer's intentions. Even very smart, knowledgeable, and 
experienced people invent bad cryptography [2.5-2.7]. 
Cryptology is an umbrella term used to describe the science of secret communications 
[2.1]. It is derived from the Greek kryptos, which means "hidden" and logos, which 
means "word". The subject matter of cryptology is further partitioned neatly into 
cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography deals with the transformations of a 
message into coded form by encryption. Encryption is the transformation of data into a 
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form that is as close to impossible as possible to read witliout the appropriate i<now]edge. 
Its purpose is to ensure privacy by tceeping information hidden from anyone except fex 
whom it is intended [2.8]. A message is Icnown as plaintext/cleartext. An encrypted 
message is ciphertext or cryptogram. The process of turning ciphertext back into plaintext 
is decryption. Cryptanalysis deals with how to undo cryptographic communications by 
breaking a cipher or forging coded signals that may be accepted as genuine [2.9]. 
Encryption and decryption process is shown in Fig. 2.1. 
Plaintext ^'P^^'^^^t Original Plaintext 
Encryption Decryption 
Fig. 2.1 Encryption and decryption. 
Plaintext is denoted by M for message or P for plaintext [2.10]. It can be a stream of bits, 
a text file, a bitmap, a stream of digitized voice, a digital video image and so on. As far as 
a computer is concerned, M is simply a binary data and ciphertext is denoted by C. It is 
also a binary data; sometimes it has the same size as M, sometimes larger. 
The encryption function E operates on M to produce C. 
E{M) = C 
In the reverse process, the decryption function D operates on C to produce M. 
D{C) = M 
Or 
D{E{M)) = M 
2.2 Encryption and Decryption with a Single Key 
A key is used in modern cryptography to provide more secure communication. This key 
might be any one of a large number of values. The range of possible values of the key is 
called the keyspace. All of the security in these algorithms is based in the key and none is 
based in the details of the algorithms. It does not matter if an eavesdropper knows an 
algorithm; he cannot read messages without the knowledge of the particular key. 
Encryption and Decryption is done with the help of this key as shown in Fig. 2.2 [2.10-
2.12]. 
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Key Key 
Plaintext 
^ 
k 
Encryption 
Ciphertext 
k 
Decryption 
Ori ginal Plaintext 
Fig. 2.2 Encryption and decryption with a single key. 
D,{C) = M 
So, D,{E,{M)) = M 
2.3 Encryption and Decryption with Two Different Keys 
Some algorithms use a different encryption key (k|) and decryption key (k2) as shown 
Fig. 2.3. 
Encryption Key Decryption Key 
intext 
^ 
k, 
1 ' 
Ciphertext k2 
' 
uecry ^ I I U I I 
Ori ginal Plaintext 
Fig. 2.3 Encryption and decryption with two different keys. 
In addition to providing confidentiality, cryptographic systems offer three important 
services: 
1. Authentication 
It should be possible for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin; an 
intruder should not be able to masquerade as someone else. 
2. Integrity 
It should be possible for the receiver of a message to verify that it has not been 
modified in transit. An intruder should not be able to substitute a false message for 
a legitimate one. 
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3. Nonrepudiation 
A sender should not be able to falsely deny later that he sent a message. These are 
vital requirements for social interaction on computers, and like face-to-face 
interactions. That someone is who he says he is that, someone's credentials -
whether a driver's license, a Ph.D. degree or a passport—are valid, that a document 
purporting to come from a person actually came from that person. These are the 
things that authentication, integrity and nonrepudiation provide [2.10]. 
Cryptography can hide words but it cannot hide; 
• Physical contraband, 
• Cash, 
• Physical meetings and training, 
• Movement to and from a central location, 
• An extravagant lifestyle with no visible means to support, or 
• Actions. 
Moreover, cryptography simply cannot protect against: 
• Informants, 
• Undercover spying, 
• Bugs, 
• Photographic evidence, or 
• Testimony. 
Cryptography is only a small part of the protection needed for "absolute" secrecy 
[2.13]. 
2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms 
A cryptographic algorithm, also called a cipher, is a mathematical function used for 
encryption and decryption. Early cryptographic algorithms maintain security by 
concealing the mathematical details of the algorithms. In modem cryptography, the 
algorithms are published so that they can undergo public cryptanalysis and can be widely 
deployed to enable secure applications to inter-operate. In well-defined ciphers, all 
security relies on the key so that each cryptanalysis against the algorithms is equivalent to 
an exhaustive key searching, i.e., a brute-force attack. 
2.4.1 Types of Cryptographic Algorithms 
There are several ways of classifying cryptographic algorithms. They are categorized 
based on the number of keys that are employed for encryption and decryption, and further 
15 
defined by their application and use. The three types of algorithms (Fig. 2.4) that will be 
discussed are: 
• Secret Key Cryptography (SKC): Uses a single key for both encryption and 
decryption. In private key cryptography, the key is a shared secret between the 
communication parties. 
• Public Key Cryptography (PKC): Asymmetric encryption algorithms, also known 
as a public cryptosystems. The keys used for encrypt and decrypt functions are 
different and computationally infeasible to obtain the decryption key from the 
encryption key. This allows the encryption key to be made public while the 
decryption key is kept private. The keys are known as the public key and the 
private key. 
• Hash Function: Uses a mathematical transformation to irreversibly encrypt 
information. 
^ ^ 
Plaintext • Ciphertext • Plaintext 
(a) Secret key (symmetric) cryptography. SKC uses a single key for both 
encryption and decryption. 
^ \ 
Plaintext • Ciphertext • Plaintext 
(b) Public key (asymmetric) cryptography. PKC uses two keys, one for 
encryption and the other for decryption. 
Hash Function 
Plaintext • Ciphertext 
(c) Hash Function (one-way cryptography). Hash functions have no key 
since the plaintext is not recoverable from the ciphertext. 
Fig. 2.4 Three types of cryptography: (a) secret-key; (b) public key; 
and (c) hash function. 
A hash function H is a transformation that takes a variable-size input m and returns a 
fixed-size string, which is called the hash value h (that is, h = H(m)). Hash functions with 
just this property have a variety of general computational uses, but when employed in 
cryptography the hash functions are usually chosen to have some additional properties. 
The basic requirements for a cryptographic hash function are: 
• The input can be of any length, 
• The output has a fixed length, 
• H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x , 
• H(x) is one-way, 
• H(x) is collision-free. 
A hash function H is said to be one-way if it is hard to invert, where "hard to invert" 
means that given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find some input x such 
that H(x) = h. 
In the real world, public key algorithms are not a substitute for symmetric algorithms. 
Instead of encrypting the messages, they are used to encrypt keys. There are two reasons 
for this: 
1. Public key algorithms are slow. Symmetric algorithms are generally atleast 1000 
times faster than public key algorithms. 
2. Public key cryptosystems are vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks. 
Public key algorithms can be used for digital signatures [2.14]. However, secret key 
cryptography schemes are generally categorized as being either stream ciphers or block 
ciphers [2.15]. The weaknesses detected in ciphers allow intruders to obtain the master 
key by any means, thus breaking the security of the system [2.16]. 
Quantifying the amount of security provided by a cipher is a hard problem. One way 
to measure the security of cipher is to measure the work involved to break it by the best 
known cryptanalysis method. In the absence of any shortcut attacks to the cipher, the 
only way to crack it is to use brute force technique (i.e., for a given ciphertext, try 
decrypting with all possible encryption keys until it decrypts to the corresponding 
plaintext). An N bit encryption has 2'^  possible keys to test, hence the complexity of 
cracking it is 2 . So in order to increase the degree of secrecy of the message N should be 
taken large [2.17]. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Stream Ciphers 
3.1 Stream Ciphers 
A cryptosystem is a general term referring to a set of cryptographic primitives used to 
provide information security services. Cryptosystems are divided between those that are 
secret-key or symmetric, and those that are public-key or asymmetric. With the latter, the 
sender uses publicly known information to send a message to the receiver. The receiver 
then uses secret information to recover the message. In secret key cryptography, the 
sender and receiver have previously agreed on some private information that they use for 
both encryption and decryption. This information must be kept secret from potential 
eavesdropper [3.1]. Secret key cryptographic systems can be categorized into either block 
or stream ciphers. Block ciphers operate on large blocks of data, while stream ciphers 
typically operate on individual bits. With a stream cipher, the transformation of these 
smaller plaintext units will vary, depending on when they are encountered during the 
encryption process, the encryption function is time-varying. An alternative name of 
stream cipher is a state cipher, as the encryption of each digit is dependent on the current 
state. Stream ciphers contain internal states and typically operate serially by generating a 
stream of pseudorandom key bits, the keystream (stream ciphers are also called keystream 
generators). The keystream is then bitwise XORed with the data to encrypt/decrypt. 
Stream ciphers do not suffer from the error propagation, as in the block ones, because 
each bit is independently encrypted/decrypted from any other. If the attacker tries to 
manipulate the inputs of the cipher, encounters the strong cryptographic operation. As 
there are fewer cryptographic requirements to fulfil, the keystream generation function 
can be made significantly faster than a block cipher. Stream ciphers as compared to block 
ciphers are easier, smaller, and cheaper to build in hardware. Global system for mobile 
communications (GSM) is the standard for digital mobile communications. Different 
stream ciphers can be used to satisfy the security requirements of the GSM networks 
[3.2]. Stream ciphers have different implementation properties than block ciphers that 
restrict the cryptanalyst. Stream ciphers can be designed to be exceptionally fast, much 
faster than any block cipher. Due to these features, stream ciphers have been the choice 
for several communication protocols (telecommunication), low-level network encryption, 
especially wireless ones and the Bluetooth. The hardware implementation of 
20 
cryptographic algorithms play an important role because of the growing requirements for 
high speed and high level of secure communications [3.3-3.6]. 
The major problem of stream cipher cryptography is the difficulty of generating a 
long unpredictable bit pattern (keystream). How to increase the length of the keystream 
while still maintaining its randomness is important to the security of stream cipher. The 
pseudorandom bit generator has been widely used to construct the keystream. It generates 
a fixed-length pseudorandom noise as the keystream. A pseudorandom bit generator 
consists of one or more LFSRs [3.7]. 
Main characteristics of stream ciphers can be summarized as the following: 
• Speed: Faster in hardware, 
• Hardware implementation cost: Low, 
• Error propagation: Limited or no error propagation, 
• Synchronization requirement: To allow for proper decryption, the sender and 
receiver must be synchronized (i.e. using the same key and operating at the same 
position within the key). 
Stream ciphers are commonly classified as synchronous stream ciphers and self-
synchronizing stream ciphers according to their capability of re-establishing proper 
decryption automatically after loss of synchronization. Stream ciphers have different 
implementation properties than block ciphers and restrict the cryptanalyst. They only 
receive their inputs once (a key and initialization vector) and they produce a long stream 
of pseudo-random data. A stream cipher can start with a strong cryptographic operation to 
thoroughly mix the key and initialization vector (IV) into state, and then use this state and 
a simpler mixing operation to produce the keystream. 
Key Initialization vector (IV) 
Stream 
Cipher 
Plaintext/Ciphertext 
-e 
Keystream 
^ Ciphertext/Plaintext 
Fig. 3.1 The Stream cipher process. 
Fig. 3.1 shows the general diagram of the cipher process with stream cipher. The stream 
cipher takes two parameters, the secret key, and the IV, and produces the keystream bits. 
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In modern cipher, the operation is the simple bitwise XOR. Decryption with the bitwise 
XOR operation takes the subtraction of the keystream symbol from the ciphertext symbol 
[3.8]. 
3.2 Stream Ciphers are not Pseudorandom Sequence Generators 
A widespread misconception is the confusion between a stream cipher and a 
pseudorandom sequence generator (PRG). Many stream cipher designs are based on 
PRGs, but that does not mean that they are PRGs. The task of a PRG is to expand a seed 
value into an output stream that is indistinguishable from random sequence. On the other 
hand, a stream cipher transforms a message, key and initialization vector (IV) into an 
output stream in such a way that the output stream cannot be distinguished from random 
sequence under a variety of attack scenarios including known or chosen message, known 
or chosen IV, multiple keys, or related keys. A stream cipher is thus more complex 
cryptographic building block than a pseudorandom sequence generator. 
However, many stream ciphers can be used as PRNGs by setting the message and IV 
to zero. When processing a stream cipher for widespread use, one has to be aware that it 
will most likely be used as a PRNG. This should not have any security implications, since 
breaking the resulting PRNG would immediately indicate a break of the stream cipher in 
a chosen-message, chosen-IV scenario [3.9]. 
3.3 Classification of Stream Ciphers 
Stream Ciphers 
Synchronous Self-Synchronous 
PURE LFSR Components 
RC4, RC5 Pure LFSR Combiners 
With memory Simple 
Block ciphers used 
in stream mode (e.g. OFB) 
EO 
LILH28 
Toyocrypt 
Fig. 3.2 Stream cipher classifications. 
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Stream ciphers are popularly classified as synchronous or self-synchronizing. These are 
further classified as shown in the Fig. 3.2 [3.10] and described briefly in subsections 
3.3.1-3.3.8. 
3.3.1 Synchronous Stream Ciphers 
In synchronous stream cipher (Fig. 3.3) a stream of pseudorandom digits (keystream) is 
generated independently of the plaintext and ciphertext messages, and then combined 
with the plaintext (to encrypt) or the ciphertext (to decrypt). This cipher works, as long as 
the two keystream generators are synchronized [3.8]. 
Seed -
Keyk 
Encrypt k, ^ 
4 
k, -
c, 
• 6 ^ 
Keyk 
Encrypt 
© - > P' 
Seed 
Encrypter Decrypter 
Fig. 3.3 Synchronous stream cipher. 
Properties of Synchronous Stream Ciphers 
1. Synchronization requirements: Here, both the sender and receiver must be 
synchronized using the same key and operating at the same position within that 
key to allow for proper decryption. 
2. No error propagation. 
3. Active attacks: The insertion, deletion, or replay of ciphertext digits by an active 
adversary causes immediate loss of synchronization. 
Most of the ciphers proposed in the literature are additive stream ciphers. A binary 
additive stream cipher is a synchronous stream cipher (Fig 3.4) in which the keystream, 
the plaintext and the ciphertext are sequences of binary digits. The output of the 
keystream generator, ki, k2, . . . , is added bitwise to the plaintext sequence pi, p2, . . . , 
producing the ciphertext Ci, C2, . . . ,. Each secret key k as input to the keystream 
generator corresponds to an output sequence. Since the secret key k is shared between the 
transmitter and the receiver, the receiver can decrypt, and obtain the message sequence, 
by adding the output of the keystream generator to the ciphertext [3.11-3.12]. 
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Keystream 
Generator 
ki ,k2, 
Pl,P2, 
•e 
Cl,C2, 
Fig. 3.4 Principle of binary additive stream cipher. 
The goal in stream cipher design is to efficiently produce random-looking sequences 
that in some sense are "indistinguishable" from truly random sequences. From a 
cryptanalysis point of view, a good stream cipher should be resistant against a known-
plaintext attack. In a known-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst is given a plaintext and the 
corresponding ciphertext, and the task is to determine a key k. For a synchronous stream 
cipher, this is equivalent to the problem of finding the key k that produced a given 
keystream kj, k2, . . . , kp. 
3,3.2 Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers 
A self-synchronizing stream cipher or asynchronous stream cipher (Fig. 3.5) is a finite 
state machine for which the keystream is produced as a function of the key and a fixed 
number of previous ciphertext digits [3.13]. The idea of self-synchronization was 
patented in 1946 [3.8]. 
Seed 
4} ^ 
Seed 
- • 
P' c, c, p. 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Fig. 3.5 Self synchronizing stream cipher. 
An example of a self-synchronizing stream cipher is a block cipher in cipher feedback 
(CFB) mode. 
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Properties of Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers 
1. Self-synchronization: Such ciphers are capable of re-establishing proper decryption 
automatically after loss of synchronization, with only a fixed number of plaintext 
characters unrecoverable. 
2. Limited error propagation. 
3. Active attacks. 
4. Diffusion of plaintext statistics: Statistical properties of the plaintext are dispersed 
through the ciphertext, so self synchronizing stream ciphers may be more resistant 
than synchronous stream ciphers against attacks based on plaintext redundancy. 
On the other hand, it is much harder to detect insertion or deletion of ciphertext digits due 
to self-synchronization property than in case of synchronous stream ciphers. 
3.3.3 RC4 
It is a variable-key size stream cipher developed in 1987 by Ron Rivest for RSA data 
security [3.14]. RC4 is considered to be software oriented stream cipher because it can be 
easily implemented in software. In security applications, RC4 is used to provide services 
of encryption and decryption [3.15]. 
3.3.4 RC5 
ft is a block cipher with a variety of parameters: block size, key size and number of 
rounds. Thus, RC5 encrypts blocks of plaintext of length 32, 64, or 128 bits into blocks of 
ciphertext of the same length. This is a block cipher but can also be used in stream mode. 
ft was invented by Ron Rivest and analysed by RSA Laboratories [3.16-3.17]. 
3.3.5 Output-Feedback Mode (OFB) 
Output-feed back mode is a method of running a block cipher as a synchronous stream 
cipher. It has no error extension. A single-bit error in the ciphertext causes a single-bit 
error in the recovered plaintext. This can be useful in some digitized analog transmission, 
like digitized voice or video, where the occasional single-bit error can be tolerated [3.14]. 
3.3.6 EO 
The stream cipher liO has its roots in the so-called summation combiner stream cipher. 
Massey and Rueppel proposed this stream cipher in the mid-1980s [3.18]. The most 
powerful attacks on this type of stream ciphers are the correlation attacks in combination 
with exhaustive search over a limited key space. The EO stream cipher used in the 
Bluetooth encryption process uses a synchronous mechanism, and it is the new emerging 
short-range wireless radio standard with low power consumption. It is an LFSR-based 
combiner with memory and actually a variant of the summation generator. It has wide 
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applications sucii as Bluetooth peripherals (e.g. mice, tceyboards, and printers), wireless 
networking, and file transfer between cell phones, computers and personal digital 
assistants (PDA) etc. [3.19]. 
3.3.7 LILI-128 
LILI-128 is a specific cipher from the LILI family of keystream generators, which was 
first introduced in keystream generator [3.20]. It is an LFSR based synchronous stream 
cipher with a 128 bit key. The design offers large period and linear complexity, and is 
resistant to currently known styles of attack. LILI is simple to implement in hardware or 
software. 
3.3.8 Toyocrypt 
Toyocrypt cipher at the time of the design was, believed to resist to all known attacks on 
stream ciphers. In Toyocrypt, one 128-bit LFSR is used [3.21]. 
3.4 General requirements of a Stream Cipher 
The following requirements are assumed necessary for cryptosystems [3.22]: 
1. Error propagation: The error propagation due to encryption/decryption should be 
minimal. 
2. Redundant information: The insertion of redundant information bits should be 
minimal. 
3. Cryptographic security: The number of secret keys should be large enough so an 
exhaustive key search attack is impossible. 
4. Simplicity of implementation: The encryption/decryption system should be 
realizable with software or hardware. 
5. Performance speed: The encryption/decryption should be performable at speeds 
ranging from Tl rate (1.544 Mbps) up to many Gbps [3.23]. 
In stream cipher design, one usually use linear feedback shift registers as building blocks 
in different ways, and the secret key k is often chosen to be the initial state of the LFSRs 
[3.11]. 
3.5 Basics of LFSR 
The two main parts of a LFSR is a shift register and a feedback function. 
3.5.1 Shift Register 
A shift register is a circuit whose identifying function is to shift its contents into adjacent 
positions within the register. The contents of a shift register are usually taken binary 
numbers, that is, ones and zeros. A shift register can shift its contents in either direction 
depending on how the device is designed. In this thesis, the shift direction will always be 
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from left to right. During a shift, the bit on the far right end of the shift register is moved 
out of the register. This end bit is often referred to as the output bit. Two properties of 
linear feedback shift register generators (LFSRs) are given as follows. 
1. Code length is a function of the number of stages in the register and the last stage, 
which determines the number, is always a member of the set in the feedback. 
2. Stable recurrent sequences do not exist for odd numbers of feedback taps. 
3.5.2 Feedback Function 
In an LFSR, the bits contained in selected positions in the shift register are combined in 
some sort of function and the result is fed back into the register's input bit. By definition, 
the selected bit values are collected before the register is clocked and the result of the 
feedback function is inserted into the shift register during the shift, filling the position that 
is emptied as a result of the shift. The feedback fijnction in an LFSR has several names: 
XOR, odd parity, sum modulo-2 [3.24]. The simplest kind of feedback shift register is an 
LFSR. The feedback function is simply the XOR of certain bits in the register; the list of 
these bits is called a tap sequence [3.13, 3.25]. 
LFSRs are desirable because of their very low implementation costs. Three general 
methodologies for destroying the linear properties of LFSRs are discussed below; 
L Using a nonlinear combining function on the outputs of several LFSRs. 
2. Using a nonlinear filtering function on the contents of a single LFSR. 
3. Using the output of one (or more) LFSRs to control the clock of one (or more) 
other LFSRs. 
3.6 Desirable Properties of Keystream Generators 
For a secure stream cipher, the keystream should be unpredictable and subsequent 
keystreams should not be able to be anticipated from previous ones. The following are 
necessary conditions for the unpredictability of a keystream [3.22, 3.26]; 
1. Long period; A keystream should have a long period. 
2. Large linear complexity; Large linear complexity implies that it is impractical 
(infeasible) to use the equivalent LFSR to predict the keystream output sequences. 
3. Randomness; A large linear complexity does not imply randomness. The statistical 
property of the keystream should be the same as an ideal random source. 
4. Proper order of correlation immunity [3.23]. 
For all possible secret keys, the output sequence of an LFSR-based keystream generator 
should also have the above properties. It is emphasized that these properties are only 
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necessary conditions for a keystream generator to be considered cryptographically secure 
[3.11]. 
3.7 Stream Ciphers based on LFSRs 
Linear feedback shift register most often used in hardware designs is perhaps the most 
popular building block of stream ciphers. The feedback function is an XOR operation of 
certain bits in the shift register. LFSRs can generate very long cycles with good 
randomness properties. There are only 2" different states possible. Since only the current 
state is known to the LFSR, after 2" clock cycles a repetition must occur. The all-zero 
state must be excluded since it repeats itself immediately. 
In order for a particular LFSR to be a maximal-period LFSR, the polynomial formed 
from tap sequence plus the constant 1 must be a primitive polynomial mod 2. The degree 
of polynomial is the length of the shift register. A polynomial f(x) over a field F is known 
as primitive if the greatest common divisor (gcd) of coefficients of the polynomial is 
unity. However, if f(x)eF[x] such that f(x) = ao+aix+ +anx" and if (ao, ai, ,an) = c 
then f(x) = cfi(x), where fi(x) is primitive. The irreducible polynomials, which are 
primitive, can only generate m-sequences [3.27]. 
In general, there is no easy way to generate primitive polynomials mod 2 for a given 
degree. The easiest v^ 'ay is to choose a random polynomial and test whether it is primitive. 
The following diagram illustrates an LFSR associated with the polynomial X'" + X^ +1. 
1 
X x^  
< 
x^  x ^ x ^ 
""Jl-
IT 
x ^ x ^ x« x"^  X'" 
Fig. 3.6 Linear feedback shift register with feedback tap [10, 6]. 
The X'° and X° terms in the polynomial correspond to the two tapped cells in the shift 
register as shown in Fig. 3.6; 1 in the polynomial does not correspond to a tap. If the 
polynomial to which an LFSR corresponds is primitive, which means that in addition to 
being irreducible (a property similar to the property of being prime for an integer) it 
satisfies some additional mathematical conditions, the LFSR will have its maximum 
possible period, which is 2" -1 where n is the length of the shift register in cells. 
An LFSR with maximum period always have an even number of taps. Also, the cell 
with the oldest bit in the shift register is always tapped. Linear feedback shift registers are 
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used in many of the keystream generators that have been proposed in the literature. There 
are several reasons for this: 
1. LFSRs are well suited to hardware implementation; 
2. They can produce sequences of large period; 
3. They can produce sequences with good statistical properties; and 
4. Because of their structure, they can be readily analyzed using algebraic techniques. 
LFSRs are the most common type of shift registers used in cryptography [3.14]. Here 
a brief review on construction methods of LFSR-based stream ciphers and detailed 
descriptions of the keystream generators is given. This thesis is mainly relevant for stream 
ciphers designed with hardware in mind, such as ciphers based on linear feedback shift 
registers. Various circuits are discussed and designed in Chapter 4 for the generation of 
lengthy and complex key code sequences by keeping the length of the shift register small. 
In many cryptographic applications, need of random and pseudorandom numbers 
arises. There are two basic types of generators used to produce random sequences: 
random number generators and pseudorandom number generators. For cryptographic 
applications, both of these generator types produce a stream of zeros and ones. 
3.8 Random Number Generators (RNGs) 
The first type of sequence generator is a random number generator. The RNG uses a 
nondeterministic source, along with some processing functions to produce randomness. 
To be used directly the output of any RNG needs to satisfy strict randomness criteria as 
measured by statistical tests in order to determine that the physical sources of the RNG 
inputs appear random. 
For cryptographic purposes, the output of RNG needs to be unpredictable. However, 
some physical sources (e.g., date/time vectors) are quite predictable. These problems may 
be mitigated by combining outputs from different types of sources to use as the inputs for 
an RNG. However, the resulting outputs from the RNG may still be deficient when 
evaluated by statistical tests. In addition, the production of high-quality random numbers 
may be too time consuming, making such production undesirable when a large quantity of 
random numbers is needed. To produce large quantities of random numbers, 
pseudorandom number generators may be preferable. 
3.9 Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) 
The second sequence generator type is a PRNG. A PRNG uses one or more inputs and 
generates multiple "pseudorandom" numbers. Inputs to PRNG are called seeds. In 
contexts in which unpredictability is needed, the seed itself must be random and 
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unpredictable. Hence, by default a PRNG should obtain its seeds from the outputs of an 
RNG; i.e., a PRNG requires a RNG as a companion. 
The outputs of a PRNG are typically deterministic functions of the seed; i.e., all true 
randomness is confined to seed generation. The deterministic nature of the process leads 
to the term "pseudorandom". Since each element of a pseudorandom sequence is 
reproducible from its seed, only the seed needs to be saved if reproduction or validation 
of the pseudorandom sequence is required. 
Pseudorandom numbers often appear to be more random than random numbers 
obtained from physical sources. If a pseudorandom sequence is properly constructed, 
each value in the sequence is produced from the previous value via transformations, 
which appear to introduce additional randomness. A series of such transformations can 
eliminate statistical autocorrelations between input and output. Thus, the outputs of a 
PRNG may have better statistical properties and be produced faster than a RNG [3.28]. 
3.9.1 Pseudorandom Noise Sequences 
The pseudorandom noise (PN) sequences are series of I's and O's, which lack any 
definite pattern, and look statistically independent and uniformly distributed. The 
sequences are deterministic, but exhibit noise properties similar to randomness. 
PN sequence generator is usually made up of shift registers with feedback. The length 
of the shift register, the number of taps, and their positions in LFSR, are important to 
generate PN sequences with desirable autocorrelation and crosscorrelation properties. 
An LFSR based PN generator with n stages will always produce a periodic output 
sequence. The initial condition of the shift register will eventually be reproduced after a 
finite number of clock cycles. The period cannot be greater than 2" (maximum number of 
combinations of n binary digits). However, due to the architecture of this type of 
generator, the all-zero condition does not occur, unless set as the initial condition. In this 
case, the generator will remain in the same state forever. Therefore, the maximum number 
of possible states is 2" - I . A generator output with such a period is called a "maximal 
length sequence" or "m-sequence". The higher the number of stages, the longer the 
sequence will be and the more random it will appear. For that reason, they are also called 
"pseudorandom noise" generators [29]. 
3.9.2 Properties of Maximal Length PN Sequences 
Some properties of maximal length PN sequences are given as follows. 
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1. In each period of a maximum length sequence, the number of I's is always one 
more than the number of O's. This property is called the balance property. 
2. Among the runs of I's and O's in each period of a maximum length sequence, one 
half the runs of each kind are of length one, one-fourth are of length two, one-
eighth are of length three, and so on as long as these functions represent 
meaningful numbers of runs. This property is called the run property. "Run" 
means a subsequence of identical symbols (I's or O's), within one period of the 
sequence. The length of this subsequence is the length of the run. For a maximum 
length sequence generated by a feedback shift register of length m, the total 
number of runs is {N +1)/2. 
3. The autocorrelation function of a maximum length sequence is periodic and binary 
valued. This property is called the correlation property. If binary symbols 0 and I 
be represented by -1 and +1 volt respectively, then the autocorrelation sequence of 
binary sequence (Cn) equals. 
R,(K) = (l/N)Y,C„C„_, (3.1) 
Where, N is the length or period of the sequence and K is the lag of the 
autocorrelation sequence. 
4. A modulo-2 addition of a maximal linear code with a phase shifted replica of itself 
in another replica results with a phase shift different from either of the originals. 
3.9.3 Weakness of PN Sequences 
Feedback taps can be found with the known continuous 2n +1 bits. So code breaking is 
done with the help of 2n +1 bits. Suppose an LFSR has 5 stages, so in order to find out 
the feedback taping 2« +1 = (2 x 5) +1 = 11 bit continuous sequence of the last stage i.e. 
Qs should be known. This is a tabular technique that produces code tap connections for 
an equivalent simple register code sequence generator. 
Suppose the known 11 bit continuous sequence is: 
11111001001 
First of all, arrange this subsequence in a column with the last detected chip at the top. 
Then shifting the same subsequence down by one row per column, generate columns until 
the number of column equals one more than the number of stages. 
Table 3.1 shows the listing of the state of shift register stages one through five, and 
the feedback (X.) necessary to feed into stage one, to produce the 11 chips that were 
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received using five stage shift register generator. The tapings mariced as * are invalid 
taps. 
In X column first entry is obtained by XORing Qs with Q3, second entry byQ, ® Qj. 
Similarly the second last entry is obtained by modulo-2-addition of Q5 with Q4, Q3, and 
Q2. Since no code is possible with an odd number of feedback taps and the stage five is 
always a member of the tap set. So there are three rows in the possible feedback column 
that are invalid. 
Table 3.1 Possible feedback tapings of 5-bit shift register. 
Q5 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Q4 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Q3 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Q2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Qi 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
I 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Possible feedback tap 
3 
2 
4,1 * 
2,1 * 
4,3,2 
4,3,2,1 * 
The rules used for evaluating possible feedback sets are stated as follows. 
1. Examine the possible feedback column for single member sets. Any single 
member is a feedback tap. 
2. Determine if any one possible tap is found in all sets in the possible feedback 
column. If so, that tap is the only one used. 
3. If step 2 does not show that a single tap generator is correct, then examine the 
possible feedback column for sets, which contain two members one of which is 
the tap found in step 1. Any two-member set that the tap already identified 
contains a second member, which is not a valid tap, and that tap can be eliminated 
from further consideration. 
4. Proceed to higher-order tap sets; eliminating invalid tap possibilities in higher 
order sets through the same process as was used in step 3. 
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5. Assemble the results. All possible taps not eliminated by the process described are 
valid, and it is necessary to generate the desired code sequence. 
The two properties of shift register sequence generators that are previously listed in 
section 3.5.1 are all, which are required to derive the taps used. A sequence generator can 
readily be constructed to simulate an unknown generator, if only its length is known. So 
the possible feedback tap for the given subsequence is [5,4,3,2]. With the help of this 
feedback taping, code breaking can be done and one can get the whole sequence [3.29]. 
To make stream encryption/decryption more secure, random codes can be used. Gold 
codes are generally used for code division multiple access (CDMA) in wireless 
communications because of low cross correlation and hence low interference between 
two different signals [3.6]. 
3.10 Gold Code Sequence Generator 
Gold codes are a set of specific sequences found in systems employing spread spectrum 
or CDMA techniques. The scrambling codes used in 3G CDMA wireless systems are 
based on Gold codes [3.6]. These systems are often used in communications equipment 
such as cellular telephones and global poshioning systems (GPS) etc. 
Gold codes are combinations of maximal-length codes invented by Magnavox 
Corporation in 1967 especially for multiple access (CDMA) application [3.30]. Gold has 
presented a method for choosing the linear maximal codes used as components in Gold 
sequences to give a set of sequences, each of whose members has cross-correlation and 
autocorrelation side lobes bounded by \9{r)\ < 2 '^ ^ +1 for n odd, and by 
(n+2)/ 
|^(A-)|<2 /2 _ I for n even [3.31]. 
Gold code sequence generators are useful because of the large number of codes they 
supply, although they require only one pair of feedback tap sets. The basis of use of these 
codes is that few sets of feedback taps are needed. Thus the possibility of using a pair of 
single tap feedback, simple shift register generator (SRG) while retaining the capacity to 
generate a large number of codes, is present. The single tap simple SRG is the fastest 
configuration possible. Thus the Gold code sequences are potentially available at rates 
equal to the capability of the fastest simple SRG. 
The Gold codes are obtained by combining two PN sequences and modulo-2 adding 
or XORing, the outputs together as shown in Fig. 3.7. The code sequences are added chip 
by chip by synchronous clocking. The codes themselves are of the same length. Thus, the 
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two code generators maintain the same phase relationship, and the codes are generated of 
the same length as the two base codes, which are added together, but they are 
nonmaximal. 
SRG 
Clock O 
SRG2 
Code 
Code 3 = (Code 1 ©Code 2) 
Code 2 
Fig. 3.7 Gold code sequence generator configuration. 
The shift-and-add property of maximal sequences tells us that any maximal sequence 
added to a phase-shifted replica of itself produce a different phase shift as an output. Now 
the same operation is performed with the new sequence having the same length as those 
being added and nonmaximal. Furthermore, every change in phase position between the 
two generators causes a new sequence to be generated. 
The two code generators are started with initial conditions offset by various amounts 
to give different output codes. The all-ones vector is set into both registers as an initial. 
Any shift in initial conditions from zero to 30 chips can be used. Thus, from this Gold 
sequence generator, 33 maximal length codes are available. Any two register Gold code 
generator of length n can generate 2" -1 maximal length sequence plus the two maximal 
base sequences. A multiple register Gold code generator can generate 
(2" - 1)'nonmaximal sequence of length 2" -1 plus r maximal sequences of the same 
length, where r is the number of registers and n is the register length. In reusing the same 
resources, the code generator is able to produce 32 separate codes simultaneously [3.32]. 
In addition to their advantage in generating large number of codes, the Gold codes 
may be chosen so that over a set of codes available from a given generator, the 
crosscorrelation between the codes is uniform and bounded, to allow as many users as 
possible with minimum interference. The Gold code generator reference design is 
efficient because the implementation allows time sharing. 
The solution, as stated, is to use two five-stage sequence generators connected in Gold 
configuration, as shown in Fig. 3.8. This figure also shows the module-2 combined Gold 
codes produced by combining the two output maximal codes with different initial offsets 
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i.e., the two code generators are started with initial conditions offset by various amounts 
to give different codes. The all-ones vector is set into both registers as an initial condition. 
In addition, one- and five-chip shifts (from the all- ones vector) are also shown in initial 
conditions. 
• ^ 
4 
^ ^ 
e 
Fig. 3.8 Illustration of Gold code generation with [5,3] and [5,4,3,2] generators. 
Zero shift combination: 
I I 1 I 1 0 0 0 1 101 1 101 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 I I 0 0 1 0 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
O O O O O O O l l l I O l l O l l I I l O I l l O l O O O l O 
One-chip shift combination 
I I I I I O O O I I O I I I O I O I O O O O I O O I O I I O O 
I I I I O O I O O I I O O O O I O I I O I O I O O O I I I O I 
O O O O I O I O I O I I I I O O O O I O I O O O O I I O O O I 
Five-chip shift combination 
I I I I I O O O I I O I I I O I O I O O O O I O O I O I I O O 
001 00 1 1 0 0 0 0 101 1 0 I 01 0 0 0 I 1 I 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 I 0 1 I 1 1 0 I 1 00 1 0 1 1 1 1 I 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Any shift in initial conditions from zero to 30 chips can be used (a 31-chip shift as 
zero shift). Thus, with this Gold code sequence generator 33 maximal-length codes are 
available. In addition to their advantage in generating large number of codes, the Gold 
codes may be chosen so that over a set of codes available from a given generator the 
crosscorrelation between the codes is uniform and bounded. Thus, Gold codes are 
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attractive for applications in which a number of code-division-multiplexed signals are to 
be used. The same guarantee of bounded crosscorrelation is impossible for maximal 
sequences of the same length [3.29], 
3.11 Geffe Generator 
A Geffe generator can be used for the generation of the keystream. The Geffe generator 
(Fig. 3.9) is simple for hardware implementation and gives codes with good 
autocorrelation characteristics. 
LFSR-2 
LFSR-3 
LFSR-1 
1 
« 3 
2tol 
MUX 
Select 
, 
« i 
i 
—*- Output (b(t)) 
Fig. 3.9 Geffe generator. 
This Geffe generator uses three LFSRs, combined in a nonlinear manner. Two of the 
LFSRs are inputs into a multiplexer, and the third LFSR controls the output of the 
multiplexer [3.13-3.14]. Ifa,, ajand a^ are the outputs of the three LFSRs, the output of 
the Geffe generator can be described by: 
b^{a^Aa2)®((-na^)Aa^) (3.2) 
where 0 is XOR, A is AND and -, is NOT. 
If the LFSRs have lengths «,, n^ and «, respectively, then the linear complexity of the 
generator is 
( « l + 1 )«2 + " i"3 
The period of the generator is the least common multiple of the periods of the three 
generators. Assuming the degrees of the three primitive feedback polynomials relatively 
prime, the period of this generator is the product of the periods of the three LFSRs [3.14]. 
The design of the Geffe generator includes the selection of the various LFSRs that are 
used in its construction so as to optimize the results of this generator. The optimized 
results of this generator can be achieved by increasing a sequence length, for a given 
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register length to be as large as possible [3.14]. Geffe generator is cryptographically weak 
and falls to correlation attacks [3.33-3.34]. 
3.12 Beth-Piper Stop-and-Go Generator 
This generator (shown in Fig. 3.10) uses the output of one LFSR to control the clock of 
another LFSR. The clock input of LFSR-2 is controlled by the output of LFSR-1, so that 
LFSR-2 can change its state at time t only if the output of LFSR-1 was 1 at time t-1 
[3.14]. 
LFSR-2 
LFSR-1 
Clock 
LFSR-3 
b(t) 
Fig. 3.10 Beth-Piper stop-and-go generator. 
3.13 Alternating Stop-and-Go Generator 
This generator (shown in Fig. 3.11) uses three LFSRs of different lengths. LFSR-2 is 
clocked when the output of LFSR-1 is 1; LFSR-3 is clocked when the output of LFSR-1 
is 0. The output of the generator is the XOR of LFSR-2 and LFSR-3 [3.14]. 
LFSR-
Clock 
LFSR-2 
i>-i 
LFSR-3 
b(t) 
Fig. 3.11 Alternating stop-and-go generator. 
3.14 Threshold Generator 
This generator uses a variable number of LFSRs. The theory behind this generator is that 
if there are a lot of LFSRs, it will be harder to break the cipher. This generator is shown 
in Fig. 3.12 below. It takes output of a large number of LFSRs. The LFSRs are chosen in 
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such a way that lengths of all LFSRs are relatively prime and all the feedback 
polynomials are primitive so that the period is maximum. If more than half the output bits 
are 1, then the output of generator is 1, if more than half the output bits are 0, then the 
output of generator is 0 [3.14]. 
LFSR-1 
LFSR-2 
LFSR-3 
LFSR-n 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Majority 
Function b(t) 
Fig. 3.12 Threshold generator. 
3.15 Feedback with Carry Shift Registers 
A feedback with carry shift register (FCSR) is similar to LFSR. Both have a shift register 
and a feedback function; the difference is that a FCSR also has a carry register (shown in 
Fig. 3.13). Instead of XORing all the bits in the tap sequence, add the bits together and 
add in the contents of the carry register. The result mod 2 becomes the new bit. The result 
divided by 2 becomes the new content of the carry register. 
Sum Mod 2 
b„ 
SUM 
Sum Div2 
bn-
Shift Register 
Fig. 3.13 Feedback with carry shift register. 
Output Bit 
Some important points about the FCSRs are given below, 
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1. The carry register is not a single bit; it is a number. Tiie size of the carry register 
must be atleast logj /, where / is the number of the taps. 
2. There is an initial transient before the FCSR settles down into its repeating period. 
3. The maximum period of a FCSR is q - 1 , where q is the connection integer. This 
number gives the taps and is defined by : 
q = 2 ' q , + 2 ^ q , + 2 ^ q , + + 2 " q „ - l (3.3) 
To maximal period of the sequence, q should be prime number, for which 2 is the 
primitive root (basic). 
Any initial state of FCSR can be defined by certain shift register, feedback 
polynomial, and the value of carry registers. From this initial state FCSR can generate a 
sequence of maximal period after the initial delay, either generate the finite sequence of 
'0' or ' 1 ' values, or can be a part of maximal period. Any initial state will result in one of 
the four things. 
1. It is part of maximum period. 
2. It will fall into the maximum period after an initial transient. 
3. It will fall into a sequence of all zeros after an initial transient. 
4. It will fall into a sequence of all ones after an initial transient. 
There is a mathematical formula for determining an initial state. If m is the initial 
memory, and / is the number of taps, then log2(/) + log2(w) + l steps are enough. If it 
generates into a never-ending stream of Os or Is within n bits, then this initial state is not 
used for the generation of maximal sequence [3.14]. 
Table 3.2 Connection integers (q) for maximal-period FCSRs. 
2 
5 
11 
13 
19 
29 
37 
53 
59 
61 
67 
83 
101 
107 
131 
139 
149 
163 
173 
179 
181 
197 
211 
227 
269 
293 
317 
347 
349 
337 
379 
389 
Table 3.2 lists all connection integers less than 400 for which 2 is a primitive root. These 
all have maximum period q - 1 . To turn any one of these numbers into a tap sequence. 
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one has to calculate the binary expansion ofq + 1. For example, 29 would translate to taps 
on bits 1, 2, 3 and 4 because 
30 = 2 ' + 2 ' + 2 ' + 2 ' (3.4) 
Table 3.3 lists all the 4-tap tap sequences that result in a maximal length FCSR for 
shift register lengths of 32 bits. 
Table 3.3 Tap sequences for maximal-length FCSR for shift register length of 32 bits. 
[32,6,3,2] 
[32,7,5,2] 
[32,8,3,2] 
[32,13,8,2] 
[32,13,12,2] 
[32,15,6,2] 
[32,16,2,1] 
[32,16,3,2] 
[32,16,5,2] 
[32,17,5,2] 
[32,19,2,1] 
[32,19,5,2] 
[32,19,9,2] 
[32,19,12,2] 
[32,19,17,2] 
[32,20,17,2] 
[32,21,9,2] 
[32,21,15,2] 
[32,23,8,2] 
[32,23,21,2] 
[32,25,5,2] 
[32,25,12,2] 
[32,27,25,2] 
[32,29,19,2] 
[32,29,20,2] 
[32,30,3,2] 
[32,30,7,2] 
[32,31,5,2] 
[32,31,9,2] 
[32,31,30,2] 
3.16 FCSR Combining Generators 
These generators use a variable number of LFSRs and/or FCSRs, and a variety of 
functions to combine them. The XOR operation destroys the algebraic properties of 
FCSRs, so it is used to combine them. In order to generate lengthy key code sequences 
for stream ciphers one may use various combinations of LFSRs and FCSRs along with 
the mathematical complexity [3.14]. 
3.16.1 Alternating Stop and Go generators 
These generators are stop and go generators with FCSRs instead of LFSRs. The XOR 
operation is replaced with an addition with carry (Fig. 3.14). 
Register-2 
Register-] 
i>M 
Register-3 
Combining 
Function b(t) 
Fig. 3.14 Alternating stop-and-go generator. 
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FCSR Stop and Go generator 
Register-1, Register-2 and Register-3 are FCSRs. The combining operation is XOR. 
FCSR/LFSR Stop and Go generator 
Register-] is a FCSR, and Register-2 and Register-3 are LFSRs. The combining operation 
is addition with carry. 
LFSR/FCSR Stop and Go generator 
Register-1 is a LFSR, and Register-2 and Register-3 are FCSRs. The combining operation 
is XOR [3.14]. 
41 
References 
[3.1] C. E. Veni Madhavan and P. K. Saxena, "Recent trends in applied cryptology," 
lETE Tech. Rev., vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 119-128, March-April 2003. 
[3.2] Chi-Chun Lo and Yu-Jan Chen, "Stream ciphers for GSM," Comput. 
Communications, vol. 24, pp. 1090-1096, 2001. 
[3.3] M. Galanis, P. Kitsons, G. Kostopoulos, N. Sklavos, and C. Goutis, "Comparison 
of the hardware implementation of stream ciphers," Int. Arab J. Infor. Tech., vol. 
2, no. 4, pp. 267-274, Oct. 2005. 
[3.4] P. Kitsos, "Hardware implementations for the ISO/IEC 18033-4:2005 standard for 
stream ciphers," Int. J. Signal Process., vol. 3, no.l, pp. 66-73, 2006. 
[3.5] S. Kumar, K. Lemke, and C. Paar, "Some thoughts about implementation properties 
of stream ciphers," 1ST Programme under Contract IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT, 
the European Network of Excellence in Cryptography. 
[3.6] Altera, "Gold Code Generator Reference Design," Application Note 295, Ver.l, 
Mar. 2003. 
[3.7] K. Zeng, Chung-Huang Yang, Dah-Yea Wei, and T. R. N. Rao, "Pseudorandom bit 
generators in stream-cipher cryptography," Comput., vol. 24, pp. 8-17, Feb. 1991. 
[3.8] Stream cipher, "Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia," [Online]. Available: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_cipher, cited on 5 Dec. 2006. 
[3.9] E. Zenner, "Stream cipher criteria," CRYPTICO A/S, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/papersdir/2006/032.pdf, cited on 30 May 2007. 
[3.10] M. Kiviharju, "Algebraic attacks and stream ciphers," T-79.514 Special Course on 
Cryptography, Nov. 2004. 
[3.11] A. Menezes, P. Van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied 
Cryptography, CRC Press, 1996, [Online]. Available: 
www.carc.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac, cited on 15 June 2008. 
[3.12] T. Johansson and F. Jonsson, "Improved fast correlation attacks on stream ciphers 
via convolulional codes," Dept. of Information Technology, Lund University, 
Sweden. 
[3.13] N. Proctor, /} Self-Synchronizing Cascaded Cipher System with Dynamic Control 
of Error-Propagation, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985. 
[3.14] B. Sc\vnt\tr, Applied Cryptography, 2nA QA. New York: Wiley, 1996. 
42 
[3.15] L. Gan, "A New Stream Cipher for Secure Digital Media Distribution," Master of 
Science (Engineering) Thesis, Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, Nov. 2001 
[3.16] R. L. Rivest, "The RC5 encryption algorithm," Dr. Dobb's J., vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 
146-148, Jan. 1995. 
[3.17] W. Staliings, Cryptography and Network Security Principles and Practices, 3rd ed. 
Singapore: Pearson Education, Inc, 2003 
[3.18] J. L. Massey and R. A. Rueppel "Method of, and apparatus for, transforming a 
digital sequence into an encoded form," U.S. Patent 4797922. 
[3.19] Bluetooth specification (version 2.0 + EDR), Nov. 2004 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bluetooth.org 
[3.20] L. R. Simpson, E. Dawson, J. D. Golic, and W. L. Millan, "LILI Keystream 
Generator," in Proc. 7th Annual Work. Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 
2000, Springer-Verlag LNCS, pp. 248-261. 
[3.21] M. H. Imai, "Cryptanalysis of toyocrypt-HS 1 stream cipher," lEICE Trans. 
Funda., vol. E85-A, no. 1, pp. 66-73, Jan. 2002 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/ATL/papers/IEICEjan02.pdf 
[3.22] M. Tatebayashi, N. Matsuzaki, and D. B. Newman, "A cryptosystem using digital 
signal processors for mobile communication," in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. 
Communications. 1989, ICC 89, BOSTONICC/89, Conf. record, World Prosperity 
Through Communication, June 1989, vol. 3, pp. 1145-1148. 
[3.23] H. Lee and S. Moon, "Parallel stream cipher for secure high-speed 
communications," J. Signal Process., vol. 82, pp. 259-265, 2002. 
[3.24] G. Rose and P. Hawkes, " Turning: a fast stream cipher," QUALCOMM Australia, 
Level 3, 230 Victoria road, Gladesville NSW 2111, Australia., Nov. 2002. 
[3.25] R. A. Rueppel, Analysis and Design of Stream Ciphers, New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1986. 
[3.26] R. A. Rueppel, Analysis and Design of Stream Ciphers, Springer, Berlin, 1986. 
[3.27] R. Kuehnel, J. Theiler, and Y. Wang, "Parallel random number generators for 
sequences uniformly distributed over any range of integers," IEEE Trans. Circuits 
Syst. I, vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 1496-1505, Jul. 2006. 
[3.28] A. Rukhin, J. Soto, J. Nechvatal, M. Smid, E. Barker, S. Leigh, M. Levenson, M. 
Vangel, D. Banks, A. Heckert, J. Dray, and S. Vo, A statistical test suite for 
random and pseudorandom number generators for cryptographic applications. 
43 
NIST Special Publication 800-22, Boulder, Co, 2005 [Online]. Available: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/rng/, cited on 30, July 2007. 
[3.29] R. C. Di xon, Spread Spectrum Systems with Commercial Applications, 3rd ed. 
New York: Wiley, 1994. 
[3.30] B. Sklar, Digital Communications Fundamentals and Applications, 2nd ed. 
Singapore: Pearson Education, Inc, 2001. 
[3.31] D. R. Anderson, "Periodic and Partial Correlation Properties of Sequences," TRW 
I .e . 7353, July 1969. 
[3.32] R. Gold, "Study of Correlation Properties of Binary Sequences," Magnavox 
Research Laboratories Report AFAL TR-66-234, Aug. 1966. 
[3.33] E. L. Key, "An analysis of the structure and complexity of nonlinear binary 
sequence generators," IEEE Trans Information Theo., vol. 22, pp. 732-736, Nov. 
1976. 
[3.34] K. C. Zeng, C. H. Yang, and T. R. N. Rao, "On the linear consistency test (LCT) 
in cryptanalysis with applications," in Proc Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 89, 
California, U. S., Springer-Verlag , 1990, pp. 164-174. 
44 
CHAPTER 4 
Circuits Developed for Complex Codes 
4.1 Introduction 
Most of the cryptographic techniques and protocols require a random or pseudorandom 
number source. The quality of this source is very crucial for security of schemes or 
protocols to be implemented. Perfect security is achieved when a cryptosystem is 
absolutely unpredictable for an external observer, i.e. all possible outcomes (states, sub-
trajectories) are equiprobable and do not depend on the previous states. In other words, 
the state sequence has uniform probability distribution and no correlation, which is 
similar to white noise. This is very difficult to implement practically. Therefore, 
pseudorandom generators are being used for practical realization of random numbers. 
Various schemes of encryption had been proposed based on PN sequence generators [4.1-
4.2]. 
Here, few schemes are presented for LFSR based complex code generators with a 
brief introduction of all the schemes. Most of the schemes designed and discussed in this 
thesis are simulated and studied through Simulink in MATLAB. Some schemes are also 
implemented with the help of ICs and other hardware components. The results taken from 
the circuits, implemented in lab using hardware and software with the help of MATLAB, 
showing interesting results. These results are in full agreement with the theoretical results 
and are shown in Chapter 6. In the end of this chapter, some complex code generator 
circuits are also presented using LFSR and programmable logic arrays (PLAs). 
Linear feedback shift registers are commonly used to generate these pseudorandom 
sequences. Due to simple, cheap and low complexity hardware, LFSR has been proposed 
for encryption of packet payloads in Bluetooth communication. A5/1 encryption scheme 
based on LFSR is a GSM standard in the air transmissions [4.3]. 
Many keystream generator designs are based on the shift registers. To make use of the 
good keystream properties avoiding the inherent linear predictability of LFSR sequences, 
many constructions introduce nonlinearity by applying a nonlinear function to the outputs 
of regularly clocked LFSRs or by irregular clocking of the LFSRs. Because of the 
weakness of PN sequences, given in section 3.9.3, many new circuits are being reported 
in this chapter using LFSRs and FCSRs for the generation of the complex codes [4.4]. 
45 
4.2 Gold Code Generator 
An LFSR is a circuit, used to produce a sequence of symbols with good statistical 
properties. However, this sequence is very easy to predict due to the linear property of the 
circuit. Gold code generators using two LFSRs are very simple circuits for generating 
large number of pseudorandom codes with good correlation characteristics. Using two 
LFSRs (of n bit shift register each), 2"'' +2 Gold codes can be generated. These codes 
can be easily used to generate lengthy complex sequences through random and 
continuous shifting of bit positions added for the Gold code generation. 
LFSRI [5,3] 
• i - > 04 Os 
Serial 
I/P 
CLK LFSRII [5,4,3,2] 
1 ^ 
1 
1 
CI 
1 
1 t> 
1 
u 
<3^f 
0, 0, 
t <c 
0^ 0. 0. 
t 
.K SRIII 
0, Oi Oi 04 0. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
J 
Mother 
Code 
-> G, 
X 
*• G2 
'f 
CLK 
Fig. 4.1 Gold code generator using 5-bit shift registers 7496. 
Fig. 4.1 shows a circuit for Gold code generation using 5-bit shift registers. Possible 
feedback taps of 5-bit shift register for maximal sequences are [5,3], [5,2], [5,4,3,2], 
[5,3,2,1], [5,4,3,1] and [5,4,2,1]. This circuit uses two LFSRs with feedback tapings [5,3], 
[5,4,3,2] and third shift register SRIIL The output of the LFSR with [5,3] feedback taping 
is giving the PN sequence which we shall call mother code. All the registers were clocked 
with the same clock. Ail LFSRs are loaded by a data other than all zero with the help of 
preset enable. Inputs X and Y (shown in Fig. 4.1) are obtained from LFSRII or SRIII 
drawn arbitrarily. Gold codes are generated by modulo-2 addition of the mother code bits 
and the output bits of the other LFSR of the same length with an arbitrary bit shifting. 
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Using 5-bit shift register, PN sequences of 31-bit length are generated and 31 Gold codes 
can be generated with serial modulo-2 addition of the mother code and the shifted 
versions of the code of LFSRII. Therefore, in total 33 different maximal sequences can be 
generated using two PN sequences. The details are shown in Fig. 4.1, in which only 10 
shifted versions of LFSRJJ are considered, to avoid the complexity of the circuit [4.4J. Jn 
Chapter 5, Fig. 5.2 shows the arrangement used for the generation of the key using some 
of these codes. 
4.3 A Modified Code Generator using LFSR and FCSR 
This generator uses LFSR, SR, FCSR and XOR function to combine them. The XOR 
operation destroys the algebraic properties of FCSRs, so it makes sense to use it to 
combine them [4.5]. In the Fig. 4.2, instead of using LFSRl, 3-bit FCSR is used and rest 
of the circuit remains the same except the feedback taping of LFSR which is taken [5,3]. 
This will increase the period of the codes MCi and MC2 and the length of the sequence 
generated in this case comes out to be 31x10 = 310 bits, which is 10 times larger than the 
length of the simple Gold codes generated using two 5-bit LFSRs as described in Fig. 4.1. 
For more complex and lengthy codes, one can increase the lengths of LFSR and FCSR., 
We have designed codes using 3-bit FCSR, 5-bit LFSR and 5-bit SR, for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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Fig. 4.2 Modified codes generator using 5-bit shift registers and 3-bit FCSR. 
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4.4 LFSRs, FCSRs and Gold Code Based Modified Geffe Generators 
In this section, a Geffe generator circuit (shown in Fig. 4.3) is being proposed, which is 
based on LFSRs and FCSR. This keystream generator uses two LFSRs, combined in a 
nonlinear manner. Here, LFSRs are the inputs into a multiplexer and FCSR controls the 
output of the multiplexer. 
0/P 
Fig. 4.3 Modified circuit for Geffe generator. 
In the simple Geffe Generator (shown in Fig. 3.9) instead of using LFSR for the input, 
select lines of the 2x1 multiplexer. It is proposed to use Gold code, which can be 
generated by XORing the outputs of LFSR 1 and LFSR2 as shown in Fig. 4.4. 
at 
0/P 
LFSRl 
LFSR2 
' 
dz 
r ^  ' 
XOR 
2 to 1 
MUX 
Select 
i k 
Fig. 4.4 Proposed circuit for Geffe generator. 
Gold codes have low crosscorrelation and hence low interference. If a, and aj are the 
outputs of the LFSRl and LFSR2 then the output of the Geffe generator is a, or flj 
depending upon a, (BGJ is 1 or 0. Here, Geffe generator uses only two LFSRs, which 
simplifies the circuit. Length and complexity of the codes generated in this case are 
increased as described below. In this scheme, output of the Geffe generator can be used as 
keystream for the encryption of any message. If length of shift register is taken large in 
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order to increase the period of keystream there may be problem of bit-error propagation; 
one bit error can cause n erroneous bits, so one should try to increase the complexity of 
the keystream keeping the length of LFSR small. 
4.5 Clock Control Geffe Generator 
To introduce non-linearity into the generation of the keystream, one may use the idea of 
varying the rate at which a register is clocked. If some arrangement is made so that the 
clocking of one register is, in some way, dependent on another register, then it seems 
reasonable to suppose that more complex sequences will be generated. 
A proposed circuit for Geffe generator is shown in Fig. 4.5. If the clocks of LFSRl 
and LFSR2 are taken as shown in Fig. 4.6, where a^,...,a^ are the outputs of LFSRl. 
CLK2 will be inhibited to appear whenever all the outputs of LFSRl are 1. Thus output 
of LFSR2 will be one bit delayed after every 31 bits, which is the m-sequence length in 
this case. With this arrangement all the 31 Gold codes (GCs) of 31 bit length each can be 
generated in series. With the delay bits included, the total sequence length of GC will be 
31x31 = 961 bits. After these 961 bits, feedback combination of any one LFSR can be 
changed. This code will also be much more difficult to break as compared to simple m-
sequence of similar length. 
CLKl 
CLK2 
LFSRl 
LFSR2 
' r ' ' 
XOR 
2 to 1 
MUX 
Select 
I I 
0/P 
Fig. 4.5 Another circuit for Geffe generator. 
CLK2 
Fig. 4.6 Circuit for clock CLK2, where a^,...,a^ are the outputs of LFSR2 
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In Fig. 4.7 another keystream generator circuit is proposed. If the clocic of LFSR2 is taicen 
as shown in Fig. 4.6, where ai,...,a5 are the outputs of LFSRl or LFSR2. CLK2 will be 
inhibited to appear whenever; all the outputs of LFSRl/LFSR2 are 1. As a result, one bit-
shifted versions of the outputs of LFSR2 will appear for onward selection after every 32 
bits of the LFSRl. FCSR controls the output of the multiplexer. 
0/P 
Fig. 4.7 Another modified circuit for Geffe generator. 
4,6 Parallel Codes for the Encryption of Time Division Multiplexed Signals 
Most of the available systems are intended for operation with only single data channel 
and cannot provide high performance data processing for the multichannel data 
encryption systems [4.6], Various techniques have been reported for parallel and secure 
data transmission. For the encryption of multiple channels of communications in a single 
box, one can use a different pseudorandom sequence generator for each stream but use of 
a different pseudorandom sequence generator for each stream requires more hardware and 
all the different generators have to be synchronized [4.1, 4.7-4.8]. Therefore, it would be 
simpler to use a single generator for this purpose. Multiple streams can be generated with 
the help of a single generator by clocking it multiple times. Three independent streams 
can be generated by clocking the generator three times faster and sending one bit into 
each stream. This technique works, but for N independent streams, it may have trouble in 
clocking the generator N times faster. Another technique is to use the same sequence for 
each channel with a variable time delay, but this method is insecure. A scheme patented 
by national security agency (NSA) [4.5], which seems to be promising is shown in Fig. 
4.8. In this scheme, output of a pseudorandom generator is passed through an m-bit serial 
input parallel out shift register. If there are n messages to be encrypted in parallel n 
different control vectors are used to generate n different streams (as shown in Fig. 4.8) to 
encrypt these messages separately. Here also, the circuit is relatively complicated and a 
simpler scheme may be found preferable. Sometimes cryptographically secure 
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pseudorandom numbers are not good enough. If an adversary gets a copy of that chosen 
generator and the master key, the adversary can create the same keys and break 
cry ptosy stem. 
Generator 
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Fig. 4.8 Multiple bit generator. 
In Fig. 4.9, a parallel Gold code generator circuit is shown, which gives 5 different 
GCs in parallel. These parallel GCs can be used for the generation of five different 
parallel keystreams, for the encryption of five different message signals. 
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Fig. 4.9 Generator of Gold codes (G1-G5). 
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4.7 Proposed LFSR based Complex Code Generator 
Randomness is veiry important because it destroys statistical properties in the message. 
Some generators have LFSR clocked at different rates; sometimes the clocking of one 
generator depends on the output of another [4.9-4.10]. Simple LFSRs generate PN 
sequences depending upon the feedback tapings and are very simple for hardware 
implementation, but they are not considered for stream enciphering because the secrecy 
obtained through them is poor. An n-bit LFSR can generate different m-sequences of 
2" -1 bits depending upon the feedback tapings. For an LFSR of n-bit if 2"-l is a prime 
number, then number of different m-sequences, which can be generated using different 
feedback taps, are 
<P = 
n (4.1) 
This comes out to be a very large number for large values of «. For example, for n=5, 
({) comes out to be 6. Similarly, for n=61, (/> comes out to be 31,800,705,069,076,960. 
However, if 2n+l bits out of an m-sequence of 2"-! bits are known, the feedback tap and 
hence the whole sequence can be easily obtained. This makes deciphering easier for 
unauthorized receivers. To overcome this weakness of LFSR based m-sequence, various 
circuits are reported which utilize more than one LFSR of same or different lengths to 
generate a complex code. In this section, LFSR based complex code generator circuit is 
given. 
4.7.1 Circuit Description 
In this scheme (shown in Fig. 4.10), 8-bit shift register is used, which gives 2* - 1 = 255 
bit sequence of Is and Os. There are 16 possible feedback taps, which can give maximal 
sequences. Possible maximal feedback taps for 8-bit shift register are [8,7,6,5,3,2], 
[8,7,4,3], [8,7,6,3,2,1], [8,6,5,4], [8,6,5,3], [8,7,6,1], [8,6,4,3,2,1], [8,4,3,2], [8,5,3,2], 
[8,6,3,2], [8,7,3,2], [8,7,6,5,2,1], [8,6,5,1], [8,5,3,1], [8,7,2,1], [8,6,5,2]. Using the circuit 
shown in Fig. 4.10, one may get a complex code for the encryption of any message. 
Anyone of the above feedback connections can be selected at a time to generate the 
corresponding code-sequence in part or in full depending upon the time for which the 
selected feedback remains connected. If these feedback connections are changed in a 
synchronous manner, the output sequence is also changed correspondingly. This can be 
implemented as shown in Fig. 4.10. 
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8-bit shift register Clock 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Feed Baci< Networi< 
7 6 5 4 3 2 
Keystream 
Counter 
8-1 Line MUX 
C 
B 
A 
Fig.(a) 
3-bit PN sequence generator 
[8,6,3,2] 
Fig. (b) 
Fig. 4.10 The proposed sequence generator: (a) Complete circuit; 
(b) Details of the feedback network. 
For simplicity of the scheme, only seven feedback connections are chosen, which are 
[8,6,3,2], [8,5,3,2], [8,4,3,2], [8,6,5,4], [8,6,5,3], [8,6,5,2] and [8,6,5,1]. One of these 
connections can be selected at a time with the help of an 8-1 multiplexer (MUX) 
controlled by a 3-bit word changing in a pseudorandom manner as shown in the above 
figure. If 000 is to be avoided in the control word (as may be the case in PN-sequence), 
only 7-inputs of the MUX will be chosen depending upon the control word. Depending 
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upon the value of N in the circuit, initial state of the code generator and initial state of the 
multiplexer a complex sequence can be generated, which seems to be very interesting for 
stream enciphering/deciphering. N decides the length of a particular sequence and the 
starting state of the next sequence (which will naturally depend upon the starting state of 
the present sequence also). A lengthier PN-sequence can also be used for providing the 
control word for the multiplexer and this will advance the complexity of the code words. 
In such a case, 3-bits of the sequence will appear sequentially as the control word. One 
more set of taping can be chosen to be connected to the input line corresponding to 000 
control word of the MUX. 
Output of the shift register as a keystream can be used for the encryption of the 
message. This keystream is very complex because it is not dependent on contents of the 
shift register but also on the different feedback taps, which can be selected according to 
the contents of the PN sequence generator as well as the counter [4.11]. 
4.8 Proposed Programmable Logic Arrays (PLAs) based Complex Code Generator 
Keeping the length of the shift register small one may introduce some logics to increase 
the length of the keystream as well as the degree of secrecy. In this section, PLA based 
complex code generator circuit is proposed which can be taken as a Generic PN generator 
circuit [4.12]. The feedback tapings in this scheme are kept on changing randomly or in a 
predefined manner, which makes the code generated, quite complex. Logic for taping 
selection can be implemented by using PLAs as discussed in Fig. 4.11. Simplicity of the 
circuit along with the complexity of the code generated makes the circuit attractive for 
low cost secure communication applications. 
A possible implementation of the proposed scheme using an LFSR of n-bit length is 
shown in Fig. 4.11. At the time of the starting sequence, the sequence will depend upon 
the first seed selected. The feedback sequence can be changed at the last bits of the m-
sequence. In this case, the seed will remain the same but the m-sequences will depend 
upon the feedback sequences. Since there are (j) possible feedback sequences, all the 
sequences can be selected one by one through the logic input for tap selection. However, 
feedback sequence can also be changed at any moment before the end point of the m-
sequence in that case the next sequence will depend upon the seed (output vector of shift 
register) at the time of the feedback change and therefore, the sequence generator will be 
quite complex depending upon the instant of the feedback change and the bit sequence of 
the control input, which can also be controlled through the control bit sequence of the 
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logic selector. So, in Fig. 4.11, key length is increased by changing different valid 
feedback tapings v^ 'ith the help of a digital control in a simple or pseudorandom manner. 
The signal thus generated at the output of LFSR can be made quite complex and suitable 
for stream enciphering and for other secure communication applications. 
C 
X 
1 
n 
vj 
2 
f> 
LJ 
3 
ry 
n 
Keys 
» ( 
tream 
"ontrol 
Input 
11 
c 
'5- c 
- .2 
a% 
o u 
•5b '^ 
o 
Fig. 4.11 General implementation of the proposed scheme. 
Logic for tap selection can be implemented by using PLAs. The number of feedback taps 
(k) decides the number of control bit for PLA and is given as 
k = log,(<z)) (4.2) 
For high bit rates, delay of the processing circuit will be a bottleneck. If the LFSR is 
synchronous, the clock duration T must satisfy the following condition given by 
T>(t3+3t,+tJ (4.3) 
where ta is the delay of AND gate, tx is the delay of the XOR gate and IA is the processing 
delay of the PLA. 
The proposed scheme is tested using 8-bit shift register, which gives 2^ - \ - 255 bit 
sequence of I's and O's. The sixteen possible maximal length feedback taps selected for 
8-bit shift register are shown in Table 4.1. The implementation of the feedback taping 
selection logic is carried out with the help of PLAs. If a 4-bit control word is taken, then 
any 16 tapings can be chosen (a choice of the designer) according to the truth table shown 
in Table 4.1. - • ' . ,. •.^ . 
v-
V33 
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Table 4.1 Output taping selection for different input control word. 
S^2^l^0 
0000 
0001 
0010 
0011 
0100 
0101 
Olio 
0111 
1000 
1001 
1010 
1011 
1100 
1101 
1110 
nil 
A 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
B 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
c 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
D 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
E 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
F 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
' 
G 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Taping selected 
[8,7,6,5,3,2] 
[8,7,4,3] 
[8,7,6,3,2,1] 
[8,6,5,4] 
[8,6,5,3] 
[8,7,6,1] 
[8,6,4,3,2,1] 
[8,4,3,2] 
[8,5,3,2] 
[8,6,3,2] 
[8,7,3,2] 
[8,7,6,5,2,1] 
[8,6,5,1] 
[8,5,3,1] 
[8,7,2,1] 
[8,6,5,2] 
Output of the shift register can be used for the encryption of the message. This key is very 
complex because it is not dependent on contents of the shift register but also on the 
different feedback taps, which can be selected according to PLAs truth table with the help 
of select lines. The control inputs of the PLA for taping selection have been taken from a 
four-bit counter. 
Various randomness tests were also performed which showed random nature of the 
sequence generated. Further, the sequence generated was applied to encrypt an image and 
the encrypted image showed white noise characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Stream Enciphering Techniques based on 
Complex Codes 
5.1 Introduction 
Encryption or information scrambling technology is an important security tool. If 
properly applied, it can provide a secure communication channel even when the 
underlying system and network infrastructure is not secure. This is particularly important 
when data passes through shared systems or network segments, where many people may 
have access to the information. In these situations, sensitive data and especially 
passwords should be encrypted in order to protect it from unintended disclosure or 
modification. 
Therefore, encryption is a popular means for data security, especially in digital 
communication systems. Block encryption/decryption techniques are quite advanced but 
they require high capacity digital computers for their implementation. Line encryption 
techniques (stream ciphers) are simple to implement in hardware using silicon ICs and 
provide moderate data security, which are found useful for commercial applications [5.1-
5.2]. 
Most of the existing work in refs. [5.3-5.5] concentrates on improving the 
characteristics of the cryptosystems, which are encryption/decryption throughput and 
required resources. So, it focuses on one aspect: minimizing the exponentiation time by 
implementing the operation on hardware. This is a worthy approach as a dedicated and 
application-specific hardware is always faster than software executed on a general-
purpose hardware [5.6]. The majority of symmetric ciphers are based on the product 
encryption concept, i.e. the cascaded arrangement of weak encryption transformations, in 
order to attain a strong cipher [5.7], 
In encryption of the data, the most important part of the circuit is keystream, which is 
kept confidential and is generally generated using PN sequences. PN sequence is a binary 
sequence, which roughly resembles the band-limited white noise and are generated using 
sequential logic circuits of the shift registers with feedback. We have used [5,3] and 
[5,4,3,2] feedback taps using XOR logic for the generation of maximal length of PN 
sequences. Encryption is done by using modulo-2 addition of keystream and the message 
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signal. The use of modulo-2 arithmetic, which is non error propagating, further improves 
the design [5.8]. 
The choice of complexity of encryption algorithm depends on the application. For 
applications, such as banking and military, highest level of security is required. However, 
for regulated access to cable TV, mobile communication etc., medium level of security is 
acceptable where low cost and circuit simplicity is also important. 
5.2 Theoretical background on Stream Ciphers 
The system's security depends entirely on the insides of the keystream generators. The 
synchronous stream ciphers are the ciphers, in which the keystream is generated 
independently of the plaintext and the ciphertext [5.9]. They generate bits from a source 
other than the message itself. The simplest of such ciphers extract bits from a register to 
use as the keystream. The contents of the register change on the basis of the current 
contents of the register. Most stream cipher designs are synchronous stream cipher 
(shown in Fig. 5.1). Some ciphers, called self-synchronizing stream ciphers, use several 
previous ciphertext bits to compute the keystream. They depend on the data and its 
encryption and also on the seed. A single bit error will result in a long burst of garble, but 
the cipher will eventually recover from a lost bit after the damaged and incorrect bit falls 
offthe shift register [5.10]. 
There are two classes of key-based encryption algorithms, symmetric (or secret key) 
and asymmetric (or public key) algorithms. Symmetric algorithms use the same key for 
encryption and decryption, whereas asymmetric algorithms use a different key for 
encryption and decryption, and the decryption key cannot be derived from the encryption 
key. 
Stream ciphers process the given message (known as plaintext) bit by bit or byte by 
byte (as a stream). Therefore, stream ciphers encrypt each bit/byte of the input data 
individually (at a certain time) before moving on to the next. Stream ciphers are also 
known as state ciphers since the encryption of a bit is dependent on the current state. A 
stream cipher is a type of symmetric encryption algorithm [5.10]. 
A keystream generator outputs a stream of bits: ki, k: ...kn. This keystream is XORed 
with a stream of plaintext bits, p,, p2 ...pn in a bit-by-bit manner in order to produce the 
stream of ciphertext bits. 
c, =p,©k, (5.1) 
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At the decryption end, the ciphertext bits are XORed with an identical keystream to 
recover the plaintext bits. 
p, =c, ©k, (5.2) 
Keystream 
Generator 
k, 
1 ' 
XOR 
Keystream 
Generator 
XOR p. 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Fig. 5.1 Synchronous stream cipher. 
In this chapter various self synchronizing stream cipher circuits depending on LFSRs, 
Gold codes and FCSRs are reported. 
5.3 A Single Channel Line Encryption/Decryption Circuits 
5.3.1 Encrypter Circuit 
In this section, single channel line encryption circuit is designed. Keystream is generated 
using a 5-bit serial-input-parallel-out (SIPO) shift register and its any two output bits for 
the simplicity of the circuit. Two 7400 NAND gates are used in the encrypter circuit, as 
Message Data 
Serial 5- bit Shift Register (7496) 
I/P 
Q, 
V y V y 
Key Ic 
> 
Encrypter 
Transmitted Data 
Fig. 5.2 Encrypter; Gi and G2 are the Gold codes shown in Fig. 4.1. 
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shown in Fig. 5.2. One input of the XOR gate is the Iceystream (k) and other is any data 
and its output is the encrypted data (bk). In order to maice keystream dependent on 
encrypted data, bk is fed to the serial input of the shift register. This encrypted data is 
transmitted over a communication channel. 
5.3.2 Decrypter Circuit 
Decrypter circuit is required in order to extract information from the encrypted signal. At 
the receiving end, clock is, in principle, recovered from the transmitted signal, which will 
be in synchronization with the clock of the transmitter. The keystream circuit is also 
synchronized with the clock, recovered at the receiving end from the transmitted signal: 
the initial data loaded in registers at the two ends are the same. We have however in our 
experimental set-up used the same clock at both ends to avoid the circuit from being 
complex. 
As shown in Fig. 5.3, the keystream code at the receiving end is akin to that at the 
transmitter end. The encrypted data received from the channel is also fed back to the 
serial input of the 2-bit shift register. The keystream so generated is XORed with the 
incoming encrypted data to obtain the decrypted data. The Gold codes generated at the 
receiving end follow the same circuits and sequences followed at the transmitter end 
[5.11]. 
Encrypted 
Message 
Decrypter 
Fig. 5.3 Decrypter circuit; d and G2 are generated at the receiving end and have 
one to one correspondence with Gold codes at the transmitter. 
In place of Gold codes Gi andG2 in the encrypter/decrypter circuit one may use codes 
MCi and MC2 generated with the help of a modified code generator using LFSR and 
FCSR (shown in Fig. 4.2). 
5.4 Scrambler for Increased Data Security and Low Bit Error Propagation 
In digital transmission systems, the scramblers are used to reduce the large runs of same 
bits, which simplify the extraction of timing information at the receiving end. Scramblers 
can also be used for stream enciphering. In general, multiples of base rate signals are 
multiplexed and then scrambled before transmission, which is descrambled and 
demultiplexed after reception [5.12]. 
A simplified diagram of a scrambler and the corresponding descrambler is shown in 
Fig. 5.4. In the scrambler, an n-stage SIPO register is used. Its output taps ai, 32...an 
provide keystream (k) through certain combinational logic circuit. In this circuit, it is 
realized simply by using XORs. The resulting bit sequence is added to the message bit 
sequence b|< to give the encrypted bit sequence bk' ready for transmission. The encrypted 
bit sequence bk' is also used for the generation of keystream k. For better data security, the 
number of stages n in the shift registers should be large. However, this causes a problem 
known as bit-error propagation. That is a single bit error in the received encrypted 
message may cause n-erroneous bits in the decrypted message. To minimize this problem, 
the simple circuit of Fig. 5.4 is modified as given in Fig. 5.5, where keystream k, is 
generated using another keystream k in the encryption circuit [5.13]. So, 8-bit cipher-
feedback mode described in [5.10] is implemented in a simplified way as shown in Fig. 
5.5. 
ai 
^^-Q^^ 
Q<—Cv*"-^ 
bk I bk' 
-e— 
-K ai 
bk' 
•^Cr-
^ b > 
(Scrambler) (Descrambler) 
Fig. 5.4 Conventional scrambler and descrambler scheme. 
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Q n i 
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Encrypt ^' ^> Decrypt 
Fig. 5.5 Proposed self-synchronizing stream cipher. 
5.4.1 Circuit Implementation 
This scheme (Fig. 5.4) can be implemented as shown in Fig. 5.5, in which Qa, Qb, 
Qc....Qn are taken from a pseudorandom signal generator, and are providing the function 
of Iceystream in Fig. 5.5. This implementation is simple and interesting for moderate data 
security. It can also be helpful in limiting the problem of bit error propagation by limiting 
the length of the shift register. One weakness in this scheme is due to m-sequence used 
for randomization of the shift register taps to generate the keystream k,. 
If [2n+l] bits of an m-sequence of length 2"-l are known, the whole sequence can 
easily be generated. To make stream encryption/decryption more secure, more secure 
random codes can be used. Gold codes are generally used for CDMA in wireless 
communications because of low cross correlation and hence low interference between 
two different signals [5.14]. They can be used in line encryption also, as given in Fig. 5.5. 
Instead of taking the outputs Qa, Qb, Qn from m-sequence generator, they can be 
taken from a Gold code generator as shown in Fig. 4.1, in which the two mother codes are 
combined by modulo-2 addition, and output of this XOR gate is given to a shift register, 
which provides the outputs Qa, Qb, Qn to be used in Fig. 5.5 [5.11, 5.15]. Further the 
complexity of the keystream k, (Fig. 5.5) can be increased if Qa, Qb, Qn are taken 
from the outputs of the Geffe generators based on LFSR, FCSR, Gold codes and LFSR 
and PLA based complex codes generators given in sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.8 
respectively. 
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Combining the two schemes, single channel encrypter/decrypter scheme and 
scrambler/descrambler scheme discussed above a parallel stream cipher circuit is 
designed. 
5.5 Parallel Stream Cipher 
Synchronous and asynchronous stream ciphers can be used as multichannel stream 
ciphers using wave division multiplexing (WDM) and time division multiplexing (TDM) 
[5.16]. In this section line encryption/decryption circuits for multichannel encryptions are 
given, which are based on the concept of time division multiplexing and wave division 
multiplexing. 
5.5.1 Line Encryption/Decryption Circuits for Multichannels 
As the operating frequencies of transmission systems grow beyond gigabits per second, 
serial scrambling techniques were no longer applicable. For example, in 10-Gbps 
Ethernet or 40-Gbps fiber transmissions, with serial scrambling, this would mean working 
at frequency of 10/40 GHZ. It is not feasible with today's silicon-based CMOS integrated 
circuits. The requirement of high working frequency can be resolved by using parallel 
scrambling techniques to enable the scrambling process at the low-frequency base rate. 
Under parallel scrambling, a set of scrambling processes is performed at the base rate, 
which collectively achieves the effect of serial scrambling when the scrambled base-rate 
signals are multiplexed to form a transmission-rate signal [5.12]. 
Technique 1 
Here a multichannel encrypter scheme is presented using Gold codes. This scheme is 
designed combining single channel encrypter/decrypter and scrambler/descrambler 
circuits given in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
In this scheme, output of the multiplexer is given into a 5-bit serial-input-parallel-out 
shift register. It reduces hardware complexity but increases the complexity of the key. As 
Gold codes work very well and give satisfactory results, so we have used Gold codes in 
our scheme for the generation of the keys. Gold codes are generated by modulo-2 
addition of a pair of m sequences. These Gold codes can be generated in parallel using the 
circuit shown in Fig. 4.9. NAND gates outputs (ApAs) in pair are connected to XOR gate 
to generate keys ki to ks as shown in Fig. 5.6. With the connections shown, ten different 
keys may be generated, which depend not only on Gold codes and initial states of shift 
register (SR) but also on the data. The different data outputs Xi, X2, X3, X4 with the keys 
ki, k2, k3, k4 are connected to the encrypter (XOR gates). The corresponding encrypted 
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data {Y = X® k) are connected to different channels of multiplexers as shown in Fig. 
5.6. 
SR 
Encrypted signa 
Ai A2 Ai A3 Ai A4 Ai A5 A2 A3 
XOR XOR 
X, 
XOR 
So 
s, 
XOR 
X3 
XOR 
X4 
XOR 
Yi 
XOR 
Y, 
XOR 
k4 
XOR 
Y3 Y4 
MUX 
0/P (Encrypted Signal) 
Fig. 5.6 Key codes generator and multichannel encrypter. 
Similar Gold/key code generators synchronized with the generators at transmitting 
end are used at the receiving end to obtain the requisite keys (ki, k2, k3, iq) as shown in 
Fig. 5.7. At this end, encrypted signal is connected to the demultiplexer (DEMUX). 
Output lines of the demultiplexer are connected to different XOR gates. The other inputs 
of the XOR gates are keys ki, k2, k3, k4 corresponding to the key at transmitter and thus 
decrypted data are obtained at the different outputs of the XOR gates. 
Decrypted data = r ® k = X © k ® k = X®0 = X (5.3) 
The decrypted data will be available on any one of the channels selected with the address 
lines in synchronization with the multiplexer (MUX). 
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Fig. 5.7 Multichannel decrypter. 
The output of the other channel will be kor k depending on the output lines of the 
DEMUX, equal to logic 0 or logic 1 respectively. Thus there is signal/data k or k (and 
hence noise) at the output of decrypter even if a line has not been selected. To remove 
these difficulties, decrypted data were connected to AND gates and other inputs of AND 
gates are obtained from the output lines of the decoder working in synchronization with 
the MUX and the DEMUX. The output line of decoder is logic 1 if selected and logic 0 if 
not selected. Thus the output of AND gate corresponding to selected line will be 
decrypted data and the other outputs will be zero. Thus, any sort of irrelevant data or 
noise is eliminated in the output. 
Technique 2 
Multichannel line encryption/decryption circuits can be designed using the modified 
codes (MCs) generated with the help of LFSRs and FCSRs (shown in Fig. 4.2). Rest of 
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the circuit elements remain the same. Using these modified codes in place of Gold codes 
in the Fig. 5.6-5.7, complexity of the keystream can be increased. 
Multichannel encryption/decryption circuits are designed and simulated with the help 
of Simulink in MATLAB (as shown in Appendix A). 
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CHAPTER 6 
Results and Discussions 
In this Chapter, the results of various circuits developed are presented and discussed. In 
sections 6.1 to 6.6 various experimental and simulation results of complex code 
generators using LFSRs, Gold codes, FCSRs, Geffe generators, PLAs and related 
encryption/decryption schemes are presented. The results of encryption/decryption with 
single channel as well as multichannel stream ciphers are presented. In section 6.7, the 
randomness test results conducted on the various schemes are presented. 
6.1 PN Sequences and Gold Code Generators 
An LFSR based PN sequence generator with n stages will always produce a periodic 
output sequence. But it is possible that the feedback taps of an LFSR can be found with 
the known continuous 2n+l bit sequence, discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3 (section 
3.9.3). So, Gold code based generator circuits with the help of PN sequences are 
designed. These circuits are easy to implement in hardware using silicon ICs. 
Feedback polynomials used for the generation of PN sequences are given in Table 
6.1. Further, these PN sequences are then used for the generation of the Gold codes. 
Table 6.1 Feedback polynomials of the two LFSRs for the generation of Gold codes. 
LFSR 
LFSRI 
LFSRII 
Degree 
5 
5 
Feedback Polynomial 
X +^X +^X +^X +^1 
Output Tap 
5 
5 
Period Length 
2'-l=31 
2 -^1=31 
Any 5-bit number except all zeros may load a 5-bit LFSR tapped at 3rd and 5th bit. In the 
present case, it has been chosen to load it by number 11111 with the sole consideration of 
ease: it produces 31 distinct sequences of internal states. 5-bit shift register 7496 with 
XOR gates has been used throughout the designs of various circuits. 
For the encryption process, complex key is required. Gold codes are used to generate 
key code because of the advantage of low cross correlation and hence low interference. In 
Chapter 4 (section 4.2), it is mentioned that for the generation of Gold codes we have 
used two 5-bit linear feedback shift registers as LFSRI and LFSRII, and a third 5-bit shift 
register (SRIII) to implement shifting of bits. LFSRI with feedback taping from bits [5,3] 
provides 31-bit sequence and its output from the last bit Qs, i was used as mother code as 
shown in Fig. 6.1(a). Other PN sequence is taken from LFSRII (Qi n) which is shown in 
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Fig. 6.1(b). These two sequences were compared with the truth table generated by 
carrying out requisite arithmetic and logic functions bit by bit at each step. 
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Fig. 6.1 Mother code and PN sequence wave patterns: (a) mother code 
(Qs,,); (b)PN sequence (Q,.„). 
One of the 10 outputs of two other registers (LFSRII and SRIII) was XORed with mother 
code to obtain Gold code. It was thus possible to generate 10 Gold codes using the circuit 
as shown in Fig. 4.1. Gold code generated by simple modulo-2 addition of mother code 
(Qs, i) derived from LFSRI and the first bit output of SRIII (Qi.iii), which was determined 
by shifting the S"' bit from LFSRII to SRIII on each clock, is shown in Fig. 6.2 (b). 
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Fig. 6.2 Mother code and Gold code patterns: (a) mother code (Qs^  i); 
(b)Goldcode(Q5,i®Qi,iii). 
When we compare the binary bits (do-dso) of the Gold code pattern with the results 
tabulated in Table B (Appendix B) by carrying out requisite arithmetic and logic 
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functions, we found that these Gold code bits are in full agreement with that of the Table 
B. From these results, we conclude that Gold code generator is functioning properly. In 
the following section simple Geffe generator results are compared with the results of 
Gold code based Geffe generators. 
6.2 Geffe Generators 
Simulation results of the Geffe generator circuits are presented here. Simulation was 
carried out for 10 seconds using Simulink in MATLAB in which number of samples was 
10''. The time period of the clock was taken to be O.I seconds and the frequency of this 
clock decides the frequency of the output of the generators. Simulation time and 
amplitude is taken along X and Y axes in the figures. Output of the various Geffe 
generator circuits can be used as keystream for stream ciphers. Output of the simple Geffe 
generator given in Chapter 3 (section 3.11) is shown in Fig. 6.3. Here period of this 
output stream is 31-bit. Because of the simplicity and advantage of Gold codes, Gold 
code based Geffe generator circuit is proposed in Chapter 4 (section 4.4). In this scheme, 
selection of the output of the Geffe generator was done with the help of Gold code, which 
was generated by modulo-2 addition of the outputs of two LFSRs (LFSRl and LFSR2). 
In this scheme, period of output stream remains 31-bit, but it simplifies the circuit. 
I 
Simulation time (sec) • 
Fig. 6.3 Output of the simple Geffe generator. 
Further clock control Geffe generator was proposed in section 4.5 (Fig. 4.5) to introduce 
non-linearity into the generation of keystream. Length of keystream (period) was 
increased when one bit of LFSR2 was inhibited using the circuit as shown in Fig. 4.6. 
Output of this proposed Geffe generator is shown in Fig. 6.4 and is used as keystream for 
the encryption of 31-bit long pseudorandom message signal (shown in Fig. 6.5). 
Encryption was done by simple modulo-2 addition and the output of the encrypter is 
shown in Fig. 6.6. 
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Fig. 6.4 Output of the proposed Geffe generator when one bit is inhibited 
with the help of the circuit shown in Fig. 4.6. 
Simulation time (sec) • 
Fig. 6.5 31-bit message signal. 
Simulation time (sec) • 
Fig. 6.6 Output of encrypter, when output of the proposed generator is 
used as the key for the encryption process. 
Reverse process i.e. decryption was done in order to extract information from the 
encrypted message using the same keystream. Output of the decrypter is shown in Fig. 
6.7. 
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Fig. 6.7. Output of the decrypter, when same key is used for 
decryption process. 
As all the sequences were having very large period, large number of samples were 
taken in order to show the full lengths of the sequences. 
In Fig. 6.8, autocorrelation plot of simple Geffe generator is shown, where tao on the 
X-axis is the amount of shift produced in order to obtain autocorrelation and ACF is 
autocorrelation function. The distance between two consecutive spikes (A, B, C, D, E) is 
31 bit, as it is expected, since the period of all the LFSRs used in this scheme is 31. 
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Fig. 6.8 Autocorrelation plot of simple Geffe generator. 
As the input lines of the Geffe generator were selected from the 5-bit Gold code generator 
circuit, the period of sequence remained the same i.e. 31 bit as is shown in Fig. 6.9. It can 
be seen here that the ACF is much reduced between the consecutive spikes. 
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Fig. 6.10 Autocorrelation plot of the proposed Geffe generator 
shown in Fig. 4.5. 
Autocorrelation plot of the proposed circuit (Fig. 4.5) is shown in Fig. 6.10, here distance 
between two consecutive spikes is 1920 bit, so with this circuit period of the sequence is 
increased 61.93 times as compared to the simple Geffe generator and the Geffe generator 
circuit with the Gold code. Due to the long period of the sequence only one spike is 
visible in the Fig 6.10. The effect of the side spikes of Fig. 6.9 is considerably reduced 
here. 
6.3 Proposed LFSR based Complex Code Generator 
The scheme for LFSR based complex code generator circuit presented in section 4.7 
(Fig. 4.10), is proposed for the generation of complex keystream. For this scheme, 8-bit 
shift register was used. Out of 16 possible feedback taps of 8-bit shift register only seven 
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feedback connections are chosen for the simplicity of the scheme. These feedback 
connections are changed in a synchronous manner with the help of an 8-1 multiplexer 
controlled by a 3-bit word changing in pseudorandom manner. 
This scheme was tested using Simulink in MATLAB. Output of this complex code 
generator (shown in Fig. 6.12) is used as a keystream for the encryption of 31-bit length 
pseudorandom message signal (shown in Fig. 6.11). The period of this keystream was 
increased by the selection of all feedback taps randomly using a 4-bit counter and a 3-bit 
PN sequence generator. Using this keystream and message signal, encryption was done 
by simple modulo-2 addition. Reverse process (decryption) was done in order to extract 
information from the encrypted message using the same key at the receiving end. The 
results are shown in Fig. 6.13 and 6.14, respectively. The scheme gave satisfactory result 
as the length of the keystream is increased, which in turn increases the security of the 
sequence. The performance of the circuit can also be seen from the randomness test 
results given later in section 6.7. 
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Fig. 6.11 31 -bit message signal. 
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Fig. 6.12 Complex keystream. 
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Fig. 6.14 Decrypted message. 
PN sequences and their lengths depend upon the value of N chosen. For example, the 
feedback tap of the LFSR changes afiJer every 2 pulses for N = 2, since the control bits of 
the MUX are obtained through the 3-bit PN sequence generator, the feedback sequence 
will repeat after every 14 pulses and the new code sequence for a given feedback will 
start from the current seed value. All these factors will make the key sequence quite 
complex Autocorrelation functions for different values of N are seen and the period of 
the sequence is obtained taking the difference between the consecutive spikes. For some 
of the values of N, it comes out to be as given below in Table 6.2. Autocorrelation plot 
for N == 4 is shown in Fig. 6.15. 
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Table 6.2 Period of the keystream for different values of N. 
N 
1 
2 
4 
8 
16 
Period of the keystream 
882 
3560 
1740 
14230 
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Fig. 6.15 Autocorrelation plot of the proposed LFSR based 
complex code generator for N=4. 
As it is clear from the Fig. 6.15, the plot of autocorrelation approaches close to that of the 
noise signal, this shows the randomness of the signal. 
6.4 Proposed PLAs based Complex Code Generator 
The scheme for PLAs based complex code generator presented in section 4.8 was 
simulated using Simulink in MATLAB and is shown in Fig. 6.16. The output PN 
sequence generated at the transmitting end was XORed with message bit-stream (image 
as shown in the Fig. 6.16). At the receiver, the encrypted bit-stream was again XORed 
with the same keystream to get back the original message. The original and the encrypted 
image of Lena (256x256 in dimension) are shown in Fig. 6.17 (a) and (b), respectively. 
With 8 bits gray level image, the ideal value of average gray level intensity of a perfect 
white noise image was 127.5. For the encrypted image obtained by the proposed scheme, 
the same was found as 127.2324, which was very close to the ideal noise. The standard 
deviation in the pixel intensities of the encrypted image was 73.8326, which showed high 
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randomness in the signal. Further, the histogram of the original and encrypted image is 
also evaluated and is shown in Fig. 6.18. The theoretical average frequency of occurrence 
of pixel intensities for a 256x256 image size (white noise image) with 8 bits per pixel 
representation is 256, which is exactly the same as obtained in the encrypted image. The 
standard deviation in frequency of pixel intensities is found as 15.7191, which is very 
small and shows that the histogram is almost flat. Correlation analysis of plain image and 
encrypted image is shown in Fig. 6.19. This shows that a fairly correlated image becomes 
highly uncorrelated after the encryption. It is clear from the pixel gray values on location 
(x, y) and the corresponding (x+l, y). 
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Fig. 6.16 Scheme for PN sequence generator using LFSR and PLA. 
Fig. 6.17 (a) Original image. Fig. 6.17 (b) Encrypted image. 
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encrypted image. 
The complexity of the code generated is further increased with almost same hardware 
complexity if control input to the PLA is derived from four-bit PN sequence generator. If 
a 5-bit control word is taken then some of the tapings may be repeated (again a choice of 
the designer) within one control cycle and this may increase the code complexity further. 
If the clock periods of the control word and the n-bit shift register, (C2 and Ci 
respectively as shown in Fig. 6.16) are related as C-^ <(2« + l)C, then the tap setting 
combination will change before the 2n+l bits are generated from the previous taping 
combination. This will increase secrecy of the system, as 2n+l is the minimum length of 
sequence required to decipher the taping combination. 
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Since the sequence generated is essentially the concatenation of possible PN 
sequences generated by an n-bit LFSR, the resulting sequence is also random. Further, 
reduction in hardware cost can be achieved by deriving the control word selection from 
specific tapings of the 8-bit LFSR itself This will remove the requirement of 4-bit shift 
register and will also cause the control word selection randomly varying with clock. 
The scheme presented in the section 4.8 generates PN sequence of large period. The 
circuits are designed to produce complex codes with lesser hardware complexity, so that 
they are suitable for realization and demonstration in the laboratory. This scheme works 
well for stream ciphers and has been simulated and tested for image as well as audio 
messages. The main attraction of the proposed scheme is its capability to be programmed 
by changing the control word sequence, to generate different PN sequences much longer 
than the conventional LFSR of the same length. The security of the system is also 
improved by choosing the clock such that control word selection changes before 2n+l 
bits are generated. 
6.5 Single Channel Stream Cipher 
In Chapter 5, section 5.3, single channel self-synchronous stream cipher scheme is 
presented. In this scheme, keystream is dependent not only on Gold codes and the two PN 
sequences of LFSR but also on data, as the encrypted data is serially fed back to a 2-bit 
shift register of the key code generator. This key is added (modulo-2 addition) with the 
data/message bk to get encrypted data bk- The encryption process makes data more noise-
like to an unauthorized user or eavesdropper. This encrypted data, which is a noise-like 
signal, is transmitted over the channel. The circuits as shown in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 are 
implemented using hardware in the laboratory taking Gold codes obtained from the 
circuit shown in Fig. 4.1. Message bk is a random sequence obtained through another PN 
sequence generator. The performance of the circuit is found suitable for the encryption 
process as complexity of the key is increased. All the results are shown in the plots (Figs. 
6.20, 6.21 and 6.22) obtained through digital storage oscilloscope. The computer plots of 
the message data, key sequence, encrypted and decrypted message show that the message 
is properly recovered from the encrypted data. A plot of the message and the encrypted 
data is shown together in Fig. 6.21. When we compare the two sequences, they are found 
totally different. The message cannot be recovered out of the encrypted sequence unless 
the key is known. 
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Fig. 6.20 Message data and key sequences: (a) data in; (b) key out. 
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Fig. 6.21 Message data and encrypted data sequences: (a) data bk; (b) transmitted data b'k. 
At the receiving end, decryption process takes place in order to get the original 
message, which is being transmitted through encryption process. A circuit identical to the 
key generation circuit at the transmitting end is implemented at the receiving end to get 
the key. In general, the circuit is synchronized with the clock recovered at the receiving 
end from the transmitted signal. The plot of a representative message along with the 
decrypted message is shown in Fig. 6.22. The one to one correspondence is too obvious 
and there is no ambiguity, whatsoever. This scheme is experimentally tested in the 
laboratory for voice signal also. The recovered voice is found intelligible. 
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Fig. 6.22 Message and decrypted message data with the same icey at the two ends: 
(a) message; (b) decrypted message. 
In Table 6.3 encrypted data sequence is obtained using arithmetic and logic functions. 
This sequence is same as the encrypted data sequence shown in Fig. 6.21. 
Clock 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Table 6.3 Encrypted data sequence. 
Key (k) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Data (b 0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
I 
b k . ( k ® b , ) 
1 d„ 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
83 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 d,„ 
6,6 Parallel Stream Cipher 
The scheme presented in the section 5.5 was tested for the encryption and decryption of 
four pseudorandom message signals using Simuiink in MATLAB. The encrypted data 
was observed at the output of the MUX. From the security point of view, one can use 
optical fibers for the transmission of the encrypted data, which is more secure as 
compared to the wireless communications. At the receiving end, the encrypted data was 
decrypted using similar circuit as shown in Fig. 5.7. 
The results obtained are presented in Figs. 6.23-6.26. In Fig. 6.23 there are four 
sequences shown (for simplicity these sequences are generated with 3-bit LFSR), which 
are 1010011, 0101100, 1110010, and 0001101 bounded between the dotted lines as 
shown in the figure. These are the 7-bit m-sequences selected for the time division 
multiplexed transmission. 
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Fig. 6.23 Four 7-bit message sequences. 
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Fig. 6.24 and Fig. 6.25 are showing the time division multiplexed encrypted and 
decrypted data respectively. The final decrypted output taken through the decoder (shown 
in Fig. 5.7) is shown in Fig. 6.26, which is same as the transmitted sequence. The four 
time division demultiplexed signals are shown between the dotted lines of the Fig. 6.26 
' 
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Fig. 6.24 Encrypted data 
Simulation Time (sec) • 
Fig. 6.25 Decrypted data (time division multiplexed). 
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Fig 6.26 Output of the decoder. 
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In this scheme, time division multiplexing (TDM) was done in a sample-by-sample 
manner. Depending on the frequency of the counter for the selection of the select lines, 
TDM can be done in bit-by-bit manner also. Complexity and period of the keystream is 
also dependent on the randomness of the message signals. Further, the complexity and 
hence the period of the keystream can be increased if voice signal is used for the 
encryption process. 
The Fig. 6.27 shows the autocorrelation plot of the multichannel encryption described 
above. When Gold codes generated using 5-bit LFSR are used for the generation of the 
keystream, period of the keystream and encrypted message, is found to be 1740 bit. As, it 
is having a separation of peaks equal to 1740 bit, whereas the m-sequences chosen for 
messages are having autocorrelation peaks of 7-bit separation (which were chosen only 
for the simplicity of the message generation). The noise like shape of the autocorrelation 
plot shows that the multiplexed messages are properly randomized. This is the condition 
for satisfactory application of the scheme. 
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Fig. 6.27 Autocorrelation plot of the multichannel encrypter. 
For the same circuit instead of using conventional Gold codes, modified codes generated 
with the help of 3-bit FCSR and 5-bit LFSR (shown in Fig. 4.2) are also used. In this 
case, period of the keystream is observed to be 8680, which is approximately 5 times the 
earlier case. 
6.7 Randomness Test Results 
Randomness tests, as discussed later in Appendix C, section 3,0, were performed on the 
output sequences obtained from the LFSR based complex code generator, PLA based 
complex code generator, multichannel stream cipher (Technique 1) (i) keystream sequence 
(ii) encrypted message sequence, multichannel stream cipher (Technique2) (i) keystream 
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sequence and (ii) encrypted message sequence. All successful test results of the designed 
circuits are tabulated in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Successful randomness test results. 
Randomness 
Test 
Frequency 
Test 
Block 
Frequency 
Test 
Runs Test 
Longest 
Runs of 
Ones Test 
Rank Test 
FFT Test 
Nonperiodic 
Templates 
Test 
Overlapping 
Template of 
All Ones 
Test 
Lempel-Ziv 
Compression 
Test 
Cumulative 
Sums Test 
LFSR 
ba,sed 
Complex 
Code 
Generator 
Y 
• / 
/ 
• ' 
/ 
Very less 
failure 
/ 
/ 
PLA 
based 
Complex 
Code 
Generator 
-/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Y 
-/ 
Multichannel Stream 
Cipher (Technique 1) 
Keystream 
/ 
/ 
•/ 
Very less 
failure 
/ 
^ 
Encrypted 
Message 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Very less 
failure 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Multichannel Stream 
Cipher (Technique 2) 
Keystream 
/ 
Very less 
failure 
• / 
Encrypted 
Message 
/ 
/ 
Very less 
failure 
/ 
/ 
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CHAPTER 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
Secure communication is the most straightforward use of cryptography. Cryptography 
allows people to carry over the confidence found in the physical world to the electronic 
world, thus allowing people to do business electronically without worries of deceit and 
deception. Every day hundreds of thousands of people interact electronically, whether it is 
through e-mail, e-commerce, ATM machines, or cellular phones. Cryptography is also 
used to regulate access to satellite and cable TV. Cable TV is set up so people can watch 
only the channels they pay for. The perpetual increase of information transmitted 
electronically has lead to an increased reliance on cryptography. 
Portable communications systems (PCSs) should provide privacy at least comparable 
to that of the wireline network. Therefore, cryptographic techniques come into picture to 
ensure that an eavesdropper intercepting radio transmission is not able to gain substantial 
information about the conversation content. 
Encryption techniques require both communicating parties to share knowledge of a 
secret keystream, and those other parties do not have access to this keystream. Keystream 
agreement is the process by which the portable system and the network agree upon the 
proper keystream. Authentication is the process, which ensures that the portable unit does 
not access the network using a false identity in order to avoid charges for usage. This 
thesis presents a new keystream agreement, which can maintain privacy of conversation 
and deter usage fraud. 
Circuits for self synchronizing stream ciphers and complex keystream code generators 
for stream ciphers are designed and improved. Linear feedback shift registers very 
familiar to electrical engineers and coding theorists, are very suited for high speed 
implementations, since they are easily implemented in both hardware and software. 
Therefore, LFSRs have been used to generate complex codes for stream ciphers in the 
present work. 
Key is the initial state of the LFSRs so most stream ciphers consist of a 
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). For encryption, the PRNG is initialized with a 
key and provides its output as a sequence of bits known as the (pseudo) random 
keystream. Randomness is very important because it destroys any statistical properties in 
the message. So complications have been added to the keystream generator. Some 
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generators have LFSRs clocked at different rates; sometimes the clocking of one 
generator depends on the output of another. Simple LFSRs generate PN sequences 
depending upon the feedback taping and are very simple for hardware implementation. 
However, they are not considered for stream enciphering because the secrecy obtained 
through them is poor. An n-bit LFSR can generate different m-sequences of 2" -1 bits 
depending upon the feedback tapings. If 2"-l is a prime number then there are 
(j) = {T -2)ln valid feedback tapings, which will generate the (j) number of different m-
sequences. However, if 2« + lbits out of an m-sequence of 2"-l bits are known the 
feedback taping and hence the whole sequence can be easily obtained. This makes 
deciphering easier for unauthorized receivers. To overcome this weakness of LFSR based 
m-sequence various circuits are designed which utilize more than one LFSRs of same or 
different lengths to generate a complex code. An n-bit LFSR can have (2"-2)/n 
different feedbacks to generate different m-sequences (provided n is a prime number) this 
property is utilized for generating different Gold codes and different more complex 
random sequences. A novel self synchronizing stream cipher technique has been 
developed which is suitable for encryption of different channels in parallel, tihat. may be 
found suitable for wave division multiplexed systems. Some of the complex code 
generator's schemes reported in literature were improved using simple modifications in 
the circuit for example Geffe generator, which uses atleast 3 different LFSRs was 
designed using two LFSRs and a corresponding Gold code. This Gold code was generated 
using all possible feedback combinations of the LFSRs selected sequentially/randomly. It 
makes the resultant bit stream quite complex. 
In another scheme, a single LFSR is chosen and different m-sequences were 
generated selecting the feedback combinations through another pseudo random generator. 
This scheme may be found suitable for time division multiplexing. The performances of 
the circuits were studied using MATLAB. Some of the schemes were implemented using 
hardware as well. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is a study of line encryption technique for single as well as time division 
multiplexed multichannel systems. The work carried out is mainly for generating complex 
codes using simpler circuits. The circuits developed are suitable for encryption techniques 
especially for stream enciphering with moderate security. They can be found suitable for 
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other applications like spread spectrum, telemetring etc. but our study is confined to 
simple stream enciphering/deciphering applications. 
The main goal of this thesis was to study and design various circuits for the 
generation of complex codes to provide moderate level of the security to the stream 
ciphers. It is tried to cover the low-level security features supported by complex key code 
generators. In digital communications using optical fibers, wave division multiplexing as 
well as time division multiplexing is frequently used to exploit the full bandwidth of 
optical fibers. The scheme presented and studied (in section 5.5) is quite interesting for 
time division multiplexing systems. It increases the data secrecy as well as the data rate in 
communication channels. Gold codes are used in the encrypter for experimental studies; 
as they are simple in implementation. Modified codes generated using FCSRs give better 
results. Geffe code generators using LFSRs and Gold codes and clock controlled Gold 
code sequences give complex codes. They were experimentally studied and found useful 
for the purpose. LFSR and PLAs based complex code generators were studied, developed 
and found suitable for providing complex and lengthy codes for stream enciphering and 
other secure applications. 
The schemes studied provide moderate data security, which can be found suitable for 
commercial applications. Their low costs and simplicity makes them attractive for lab 
demonstration in educational institutions also. 
NIST randomness tests were done on the keystreams generated with the help of the 
proposed circuits in order to check the randomness of the sequences. Though the schemes 
presented are found to be working satisfactory, some of the randomness tests could not 
pass because of the smaller lengths of the sequences. 
High level data secrecy, which is mainly used in military applications and other highly 
secure commercial applications, may be developed with lengthy LFSRs but these were 
not studied because of the limitations in their experimental studies in our labs. Here 
circuits were developed using LFSRs of relatively smaller length (8 bit) just to keep them 
simple for experimental studies. On the same principle, the lengthy shift registers can also 
be used and naturally they will certainly give better randomness results. 
Future Work 
Keeping the circuit simplicity in mind smaller shift registers (mainly 5-bit shift registers) 
are used for the generation of complex codes. The experimental study was also found 
simple and suitable for laboratory demonstrations. Simulation studies are also done on 
the designed circuits. For various applications it may be desirable to use the circuits with 
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the lengthier shift register, so that the code generated are having higher complexity. 
Future work may include the study of circuits developed on the same line with the 
lengthier and faster shift registers. The complexity may be further increased using such 
circuits. For example the complex code generators discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
are using mainly LFSRs. The code complexity of these generators can be further 
increased if the LFSRs in the circuits are replaced by other complex code generators. 
Further, the work can be extended based on code generators using PLAs in which the 
selection of feedback taps can be randomized in multiple ways. 
All the circuits may be developed based on modular shift register generators. The 
circuits will be slightly more complicated as compared to simple LFSR but the delay in 
feedback path is reduced so it will be better for high data rate applications. 
Only a few circuits are developed using FCSRs. More circuits based on FCSRs can 
be developed and studied. A parallel stream enciphering is an interesting area and useful 
for high data rate enciphering. However, only one such scheme is presented in this thesis. 
More work can be done in this direction. 
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Appendix B 
Table B A representative Gold code sequence. 
Clock 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
M 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Qs, 1 (Mother code) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
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1 
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1 
1 
0 
0 
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1 
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1 
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1 
1 
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1 
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0 
1 ; 
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1 ; 
0 I 
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1 d2» 
! d,o 
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Appendix C 
Randomness Tests 
1.0 Statistical Analysis and Interpretation of Empirical Results 
To test the randomness of binary sequences generated by complex code generators the 
NIST suite, proposed by National Institute of Standards and Technology, is used. The 
NIST suite includes sixteen tests [1]. These tests fix on a variety of different types of non-
randomness that could exist in a sequence. All these tests are frequency (monobit), 
frequency within a block, runs, longest-run-of-ones in a block, binary matrix rank, 
discrete Fourier transform (spectral), non-overlapping template matching, overlapping 
template matching, Maurer's "Universal statistical", Lempel-Ziv compression, linear 
complexity, serial, approximate entropy, cumulative sums, random excursions, random 
excursions variant. Out of these sixteen tests some are discussed below, which gave 
successful results when tested for the output binary sequences of the presented schemes in 
this thesis. 
The testing process consists of the following steps [I]: 
(1) State the null hypothesis. Assume that the binary sequence is random. 
(2) Compute a sequence test statistic. Testing is carried out at the bit level. 
(3) Compute the P-value, P-valuee [0, I] 
(4) Compare the P-value to a. Fix a, where a e [0.0001, 0.01]. Success is declared 
whenever P value > a; otherwise, failure is declared. 
2.0 Frequency (Monobit) Test 
2.0.1 Test Purpose 
The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of ones and zeros in a 
sequence are approximately the same as would be expected for a truly random sequence. 
The test assesses the closeness of the fraction of ones to Vi, that is, the number of ones 
and zeroes in a sequence. They should be about the same. All subsequent tests depend on 
the passing of this test; there is no evidence to indicate that the tested sequence is non-
random. 
2.0.2 Function Call 
Frequency («), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
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e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; s ~e^,e.^,...,e„. 
2.0.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
Sgijg: The absolute value of the sum of the X, (where, X, = 2f -1 = ±1) in the 
sequence divided by the square root of the length of the sequence. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is half normal (for large n). If z, 
where z = ^ g^yVl is distributed as normal, then \z\ is distributed as half normal. If the 
sequence is random, then the plus and minus ones will tend to cancel one another out so 
that the test statistic will be about 0. If there are too many ones or too many zeroes, then 
the test statistic will tend to be larger than zero. 
2.0.4 Test Description 
(1) Conversion to ±1: The zeros and ones of the input sequence (e) are converted to 
values o f -1 and +1 and are added together to produce^^ = X, 4-X2+... + X„, 
where X. - 2s, -1. 
(2) Compute the test statistic .y^^^  - -~ 
f. ^
obs 
v .^ (3) Compute P-value = erfc 
given by 
erfc{z) = -j= le'" du 
where erfc is the complementary error function 
2 
2.1 Frequency Test within a Block 
2.1.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of the test is the proportion of ones within M-bit blocks. The purpose of this 
test is to determine whether the frequency of ones in an M-bit block is approximately 
M/2, as would be expected under an assumption of randomness. For block size A/=I, this 
test degenerates to the frequency (monobit) test. 
2.1.2 Function Call 
Block frequency {M, n), where, 
M The length of each block. 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code. 
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e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this 
exists as a global structure at the time of the function call; e - e^,ej,...,e^. 
2.1.3 Test Statistic 
X^(obs): A measure of how well the observed proportion of ones within a given M-
bit block match the expected proportion (1/2). 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is a ;}f^  distribution. 
2.1.4 Test Description 
n (I) Partition the input sequence into A'^  = 
M 
non-overlapping blocks. Discard any 
unused bits. 
(2) Determine the proportion TT, of ones in each M-bit block using the equation 
M 
n, = ^ , for I < / < jV . 
M 
N 
(3) Compute the z'' statistic: /^(o^^) = 4A/^(;r , - l /2)\ 
1=1 
(4) Compute P-value = igamc {N/2, x^ (obs)/2), where igamc is the incomplete gamma 
function for Q{a,x) as defined below 
Gamma Function 
00 
r(z) = \r'e-'dt 
0 
Incomplete Gamma Function 
Y{a) Y{a)l 
where P(a,0) = 0 and /'(a,oo) = l 
Incomplete Gamma Function 
T{a,x) _ 1 
Y{a) ~T{Q 
Where Q{afi) = 1 and e(a,oo) = 0. 
Y{a) I 
1.1 Runs Test 
2.2,1 Test Purpose 
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The focus of this test is the total number of runs in the sequence, where a run is an 
uninterrupted sequence of identical bits. A run of length k consists of exactly k identical 
bits and is bounded before and after with a bit of the opposite value. The purpose of the 
runs test is to determine whether the number of runs of ones and zeros of various lengths 
is as expected for a random sequence. In particular, this test determines whether the 
oscillation between such zeros and ones is too fast or too slow. 
2.2.2 Function Call 
Runs (n), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional inputs for the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; e~e^,e-^,...,e^. 
1.1.1) Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
V^{ohs): The total number of runs (i.e., the total number of zero runs + the total 
number of one-runs) across all n bits. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is a x'' distribution. 
2.2.4 Test Description 
Note; The Runs test carries out a Frequency test as a prerequisite. 
(1) Compute the pre-test proportion ;T of ones in the input sequence: n - —-—. 
n 
(2) Determine if the prerequisite Frequency test is passed: If it can be shown that 
;T - jZ > r , then the Runs test need not be performed i.e., the test should not have 
been run because of a failure to pass test, the Frequency (monobit) test. If the test is 
2 
not applicable, then the P-value is set to 0.0000. Note that for this test, '^ = —j= has 
been pre-defined in the test code. 
«-i 
(3) Compute the test statistic V^{obs) = ^r{k) + \, where r{k) = 0 if f'^  =fj^|,and 
r{k) = 1 otherwise. 
(\V„{obs)-2nn{\-nf' 
(4) Compute P-value = erfc 1= 
y 2yJ2nn{\-n) 
2.3 Test for the Longest Run of Ones in a Block 
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2.3.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of the test is the longest run of ones within M-bit bloci<is. The purpose of this 
test is to determine whether the length of the longest run of ones within the tested 
sequence is consistent with the length of the longest run of ones that would be expected in 
a random sequence. Note that an irregularity in the expected length of the longest run of 
ones implies that there is also an irregularity in the expected length of the longest run of 
zeroes. Therefore, only a test for ones is necessary. 
2.3.2 Function Call 
Longest Run Of Ones («), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input for the function supplied by the testing code, 
e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; s - s^,s^,...,s^. 
The length of each block. The test code has been pre-set to accommodate three 
values for h\: M = 8, M = 128 and A/ = 10'' in accordance with the following 
table. 
M 
Minimum « 
128 
6272 
750,000 
M 
8 
128 
10' 
N The number of blocks; selected in accordance with the value of A/. 
2.3.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
Z (obs): A measure of how well the observed longest run length within M-bit 
blocks matches the expected longest length within M-bit blocks. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is a x^ distribution. 
2.3.4 Test Description 
(1) Divide the sequence into M-bit blocks. 
(2) Tabulate the frequencies v, of the longest runs of ones in each block into categories, 
where each cell contafns the number of runs of ones of a given iength. 
For the values of M supported by the test code, the v, cells will hold the following 
counts, 
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Vi 
VO 
VI 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
V6 
M = 8 
<1 
2 
3 
>4 
M=128 
<4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
>9 
1^ = 10' 
< 10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
> 16 
(3) Compute;^^(o^,.) = X ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ • 
The values of K and N are determined by the value of M in accordance with the following 
table: 
M 
8 
128 
10^  
K 
3 
5 
6 
N 
16 
49 
75 
(4) Compute P-value = igamc 
2 ' 2 
2.4 Binary Matrix Rank Test 
2.4.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of the test is the rank of disjoint sub-matrices of the entire sequence. The 
purpose of this test is to check for linear dependence among fixed length substrings of the 
original sequence. 
2.4.2 Function Call 
Rank (n), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function supplied by the testing code, 
8 The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; s = s^,s-^,...,e„. 
M The number of rows in each matrix. For the test suite, M has been set to 32. If 
other values of Mare used, new approximations need to be computed. 
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Q The number of columns in each matrix. For the test suite, Q has been set to 32. If 
other values of ^ are used, new approximations need to be computed. 
2.4.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
X^{obs): A measure of how well the observed number of ranks of various orders 
match the expected number of ranks under an assumption of randomness. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is a x^ distribution. 
2.4.4 Test Description 
(1) Sequentially divide the sequence into M'Q-hlt disjoint blocks; there will exist 
n 
'MQ 
computation within each block. Collect the M-Q bit segments into Mhy Q matrices. 
Each row of the matrix is filled with successive Q-hit blocks of the original sequence 
e. 
(2) Determine the binary rank R{i) of each matrix, where i = l,...,N. 
(3) Let FM= the number of matrices with R(() = M(full rank), 
FM-I = the number of matrices with R(i) = M-1 (full rank - 1), 
A'^ - FM- FM-I = the number of matrices remaining. 
A^ : such blocks. Discarded bits will be reported as not being used in the 
(4) Compute 
(F^-0.2888A^)^^(/V,-,-0.5776^)^ , (iV-F^-Z^.,-0.13367V)^ 
x\obs)=^ ^ / ^v M-i - - - • / ^. 
0,2888iV 0.5776yv 0.1336A^ 
(5) Compute P -value= e'"'^"''^^'. 
2.5 Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 
2.5.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of this test is the peak heights in the discrete Fourier transform of the sequence. 
The purpose of this test is to detect periodic features (i.e., repetitive patterns that are near 
each other) in the tested sequence that would indicate a deviation from the assumption of 
randomness. The intention is to detect whether the number of peaks exceeding the 95 % 
threshold is significantly different than 5 %. 
2.5.2 Function Call 
Discrete Fourier Transform («), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
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e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; e = 6^,62,•••,£„ • 
2.5.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
d: The normalized difference between the observed and the expected number of 
frequency components that are beyond the 95 % threshold. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is the normal distribution. 
2.5.4 Test Description 
(1) The zeros and ones of the input sequence (f) are converted to values of-1 and +1 to 
create the sequence X = x,,x^,.• •,^„, where x, =2s,-\. 
(2) Apply a Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) on X to produce: S = DFT(X). A sequence 
of complex variables is produced which represents periodic components of the 
sequence of bits at different frequencies. 
(3) Calculate M = modulus(S') s |5"|, where S' is the substring consisting of the first n/2 
elements in S, and the modulus function produces a sequence of peak heights. 
(4) Compute T = V3n = the 95 % peak height threshold value. Under an assumption of 
randomness, 95 % of the values obtained from the test should not exceed T. 
(5) Compute No '=0.95n/2. No is the expected theoretical (95 %) number of peaks (under 
the assumption of randomness) that are less than T. 
(6) Compute A'^y = the actual observed number of peaks in A/that are less than T. 
(7) Compute d = (A^,-A^o) 
>(.95)(.05)/2 
(\4 
(S) Compute P-value= erfc - ^ 
2.6 Non-overlapping Template Matching Test 
2.6.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of this test is the number of occurrences of pre-specified target strings. The 
purpose of this test is to detect generators that produce too many occurrences of a given 
non-periodic (aperiodic) pattern. 
2.6.2 Function Call 
Non overlapping template matching (m, n) 
m The length in bits of each template. The template is the target string. 
n The length of the entire bit string under test. 
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Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; s = £^,s.^,...,e,^. 
B The m-h\\ template to be matched; 5 is a string of ones and zeros (of length m) 
which is defined in a template library of non-periodic patterns contained within 
the test code. 
M The length in bits of the substring of s to be tested. 
N The number of independent blocks. 
2.6.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
X^ (obs): A measure of how well the observed number of template "hits" matches 
the expected number of template "hits" (under an assumption of 
randomness). 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is the ;j'^ distribution. 
2.6.4 Test Description 
(1) Partition the sequence into N independent blocks of length M. 
(2) Let ^ (/ = 1, ..., JV) be the number of times that B (the template) occurs within the 
block j . The search for matches proceeds by creating an w-bit window on the 
sequence, comparing the bits within that window against the template. If there is no 
match, the window slides over one bit, e.g., if w =3 and the current window contains 
bits 3 to 5, then the next window will contain bits 4 to 6. If there is a match, the 
window slides over m bits, e.g., if the current (successful) window contains bits 3 to 5, 
then the next window will contain bits 6 to 8. 
(3) Under an assumption of randomness, compute the theoretical mean // and variance 
cr': 
M = (M-m + \)/2'", 
^J 2m-0 (7^ =M 
'^ (W -u) 
(4) Compute z\obs) = ^ ' ; 
(5) Compute P-value = igamc 
2 ' 2 
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2.7 Overlapping Template Matching Test 
2.7.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of the overlapping template matching test is the number of occurrences of 
prespecified target strings. Both this test and the non-overlapping template matching test 
of Section 2.6 use an m-bit window to search for a specific m-bit pattern. As with the test 
in Section 2.6, if the pattern is not found, the window slides one bit position. The 
difference between this test and the test in Section 2.6 is that when the pattern is found, 
the window slides only one bit before resuming the search. 
2.7.2 Function Call 
Overlapping template matching (m, n) 
m The length in bits of the template - in this case, the length of the run of ones, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; e = e^,£^,...,e^. 
B The m-bit template to be matched. 
K The number of degrees of freedom. K has been fixed at 5 in the test code. 
M The length in bits of a substring of e to be tested. M has been set to 1032 in the 
test code. 
N The number of independent blocks of n. N has been set to 968 in the test code. 
2.7.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
X^{ohs): A measure of how well the observed number of template "hits" matches 
the expected number of template "hits" (under an assumption of 
randomness). 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is the j ^ distribution. 
(1) Partition the sequence into//independent blocks of length M. 
(2) Calculate the number of occurrences of B in each of the N blocks. The search for 
matches proceeds by creating an m-bit window on the sequence, comparing the bits 
within that window against B and incrementing a counter when there is a match. The 
window slides over one bit after each examination, e.g., \im = 4 and the first window 
contains bits 42 to 45, the next window consists of bits 43 to A(i. Record the number 
of occurrences of 5 in each block by incrementing an array v, (where / = 0,...5), such 
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that VQ is incremented when there are no occurrences of 5 in a substring, v^ is 
incremented for one occurrence of B,...and v^ is incremented for 5 or more 
occurrences of 5. 
(3) Compute values for A and ;; that will be used to compute the theoretical probabilities 
;T, corresponding to the classes of v^ 
A = iM-m + \)/2"' and rj = A/2. 
(4) Compute x'iobs) = t^ '^ '""/ ' ' '^ • 
(5) Compute P-vahie = igamc 5 x\obs) 
2' 2 
2.8 Lempel-Ziv Compression Test 
2.8.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of this test is the number of cumulatively distinct patterns (words) in the 
sequence. The purf)ose of the test is to determine how far the tested sequence can be 
compressed. The sequence is considered to be non-random if it can be significantly 
compressed. A random sequence will have a characteristic number of distinct patterns. 
2.8.2 Function Call 
Lempel-Ziv compression («), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
£• The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; E = S^,EJ,...,£^ . 
2.8.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
Wobs: The number of disjoint and cumulatively distinct words in the sequence. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is the normal distribution. 
2.8.4 Test Description 
(1) Resolve the sequence into consecutive, disjoint and distinct words that will form a 
"dictionary" of words in the sequence. This is accomplished by creating substrings 
from consecutive bits of the sequence until a substring is created that has not been 
found previously in the sequence. The resulting substring is a new word in the 
dictionary. 
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Bit Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Bit 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
New Word? 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
The Word is: 
0(Bit 1) 
1 (Bit 2) 
01 (Bits 3-4) 
10 (Bits 5-6) 
010 (Bits 7-9) 
There are five words in the "dictionary": 0, 1,01, 10, 010. Hence, Wots = 5. 
(2) Compute P-value= \/2erfc obs 
42? 
2.9 Linear Complexity Test 
2.9.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of this test is the length of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The purpose 
of this test is to determine whether or not the sequence is complex enough to be 
considered random. Random sequences are characterized by longer LFSRs. An LFSR that 
is too short implies nonrandomness. 
2.9.2 Function Call 
Linear complexity (M, n), where, 
M The length in bits of a block. 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input used by the function, but supplied by the testing code, 
e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; e = E^,£2,-,£„ • 
K The number of degrees of freedom; K = 6has been hard coded into the test. 
2.9.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
X^ (obs): A measure of how well the observed number of occurrences of fixed 
length LFSRs matches the expected number of occurrences under an 
assumption of randomness. 
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The reference distribution for the test statistic is the x'' distribution. 
2.9.4 Test Description 
(1) Partition the «-bit sequence into A^  independent blocks of Mbits, where n = MN. 
(2) Using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithms, determine the linear complexity L of each 
of the A'^  blocks (/ = 1,...,N). L is the length of the shortest linear feedback shift 
register sequence that generates all bits in the block /. Within any I/-bit sequence, 
some combination of the bits, when added together modulo-2, produces the next bit in 
the sequence (bit L + 1). 
(3) Under an assumption of randomness, calculate the theoretical mean/i: 
// = — + 
2 
M (9+(-ir '^) (^+/ i ) 
36 2"" 
(4) For each substring, calculate a value of L, where T, =(-1)'^ "(A -/^) + % . 
(5) Record the 71 values in v^,..., v^ as follows: 
If: T, < -2.5 
-2.5 < r, < -1.5 
-\.5<T,< -0.5 
-0.5 <T,< 0.5 
0.5 < 7, < 1.5 
\.5<T,< 2.5 
T,>2.5 
Increment V(, by one 
Increment v, by one 
Increment Vj by one 
Increment Vj by one 
Increment v^ by one 
Increment v, by one 
Increment v^ by one 
(6) z\obs)-t^'''-'''•'>' 
Nn. 
(7) Compute P-value = igamc K x\obs) 
2 ' 2 
2.10 Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test 
2.10.1 Test Purpose 
The focus of this test is the maximal excursion (from zero) of the random walk defined by 
the cumulative sum of adjusted (-1, +1) digits in the sequence. The purpose of the test is 
to determine whether the cumulative sum of the partial sequences occurring in the tested 
sequence is too large or too small relative to the expected behavior of that cumulative 
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sum for random sequences. This cumulative sum may be considered as a random wallc. 
For a random sequence, the excursions of the random walk should be near zero. For 
certain types of non-random sequences, the excursions of this random walk, from zero will 
be large. 
2.10.2 Function Call 
Cumulative sums (mode, n), where, 
n The length of the bit string. 
Additional input for the function, but supplied by the testing code: 
e The sequence of bits as generated by the RNG or PRNG being tested; this exists 
as a global structure at the time of the function call; s - s^,e^,...,s^. 
mode A switch for applying the test either forward through the input sequence (mode=0) 
or backward through the sequence {mode = 1). 
2.10.3 Test Statistic and Reference Distribution 
z: The largest excursion from the origin of the cumulative sums in the corresponding 
(-1,+ 1) sequence. 
The reference distribution for the test statistic is the normal distribution. 
2.10.4 Test Description 
(1) Form a normalized sequence: The zeros and ones of the input sequence {e) are 
converted to values X,of-1 and +1 using X^=2s^-\. 
(2) Compute partial sums S, of successively larger subsequences, each starting with X^ 
(if mode = 0) or X„ (if mode = 1). 
Mode = 0 (forward) 
SJ = XI 
S2 = Xl + X2 
S3^Xl+X2 + Xi 
Mode = 1 (backward) 
& = Xy + X2 + A0+. . . +Xk 
Sn=X!+X2 + X3+ ... +Xk+ ...+Xn 
Sl^Xn 
S2 = Xn + Xn-I 
S3=Xn + X„-l+Xn-2 
Sk = Xn + Xn-I + Xn-2 + ... + Xn-k+l 
Sn = Xn + Xn-1 + Xn-2 + ... + Xk-l + ... + Xl 
That is, S^ - S^_^ + X^ for mode 0, and S^ - S^_^ + X^_^^^ for mode 1. 
(3) Compute the test statistic z = max^^|^^„\S|,\, where max,<j5„|5'J is the largest of the 
absolute values of the partial sums S^. 
(4) Compute P-value = 1 - 2^ <P (4k + l)z •<l> {Ak-\)z + 
Z (4A: + 3)z (^M)z_ 4n ) 
Where (f) is the Standard Normal Cumulative Probability Distribution Function given by 
(/)(Z) = \e-"'l'du 
3.0 Randomness Test Result 
Randomness tests were performed on the output sequences obtained from the following: 
• LFSR based complex code generator 
• PLA based complex code generator 
• Multichannel stream cipher (Technique 1) 
(i) Keystream sequence 
(ii) Encrypted message sequence 
• Multichannel stream cipher (Technique 2) 
(i) Keystream sequence 
(ii) Encrypted message sequence 
For every randomness test P-value is computed. Then these P-values are compared to a 
in order to decide, whether a test is success or failure, where a e [0.0001, 0.01]. Success 
is declared, whenever P value > a; otherwise, failure is declared. Randomness tests, 
which were passed successfully, are given below. 
3.0.1 LFSR based Complex Code Generator 
Frequency Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The nth partial sum = -23 
(b) S_n/n = -0.004599 
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SUCCESS P_value = 0.745002 
Block Frequency Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) j ' =39.187500 
(b) Number of substrings = 39 
(c) Block length =128 
(d) Note: 9 bits were discarded. 
SUCCESS P_va!ue = 0.461466 
Runs Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) n = 0.497700 
(b) VXohs) (Total number of runs) = 2505 
(c) VXohs) -Iwn {\-n) 
- =0.091051 
2 sqrt(2n) n {\-n) 
SUCCESS Pvalue = 0.897544 
Longest Runs of Ones Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) N (Number of substrings)= 0 
(b) M (Substring Length) = 10000 
(c) x" =-!• # INDOO 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
12 
<=10 11 12 13 14 15>=16 P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000000 SUCCESS 
Rank Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) Probability P32 = 0.288788 
(b) P3i= 0.577576 
(c) P3o = 0.133636 
(d) Frequency F32 = 1 
(e) F3, = 3 
(f) F30 = 0 
(g) Number of matrices= 4 
(h) j ' =0.761277 
(i) NOTE: 905 BITS WERE DISCARDED. 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.683425 
Nonperiodic Templates Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION 
LAMBDA = 0.601563 M = 625 N = 8 m = 10 n = 5001 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
Template W, W2 W3 W4 W5 We W7 Wg x" P_value Assignment Index 
OOOIOlIlll 
0001100101 
0001100111 
0001101001 
0001101011 
0001101101 
0001101111 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
I 
1 
0 4.832872 0.775281 SUCCESS 44 
0 3.815597 0.873366 SUCCESS 45 
1 3.815597 0.873366 SUCCESS 46 
1 3.815597 0.873366 SUCCESS 47 
 0 4.154689 0.842904 SUCCESS 48 
1 0 9.475821 0.303758 SUCCESS 49 
0 2.798322 0.946369 SUCCESS 50 
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Overlapping Template of All Ones Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) n (sequence_length) =5001 
(b)m (block length of Is) =10 
(c) M (length of substring) = 1032 
(d) N (number of substrings)= 4 
(e) /l= [(M-m+l)/2n = 0.999023 
(f)/; =0.499512 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
0 1 2 3 4 >=5 x^ P-value Assignment 
4 0 0 0 0 0 2.591666 0.762631 SUCCESS 
Cumulative Sums (FORWARD) Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The maximum partial sum = 35 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.991729 
Cumulative Sums (REVERSE) Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The maximum partial sum = 58 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.796580 
3.0.2 FLA based Complex Code Generator 
In order to ascertain the randomness of the sequence generated with the help of the PLA 
based complex generator circuit, statistical randomness tests (such as runs, rank, Lempel-
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Ziv compression, frequency, cumulative sums and bioctc frequency) were also applied to 
the generated sequence, which were passed successfully. 
3.0.3 Multichannel Stream Cipher (Technique 1) 
Randomness tests were performed on the keystreams and encrypted data generated in 
multichannel stream cipher (Technique 1) where Gold codes and LFSRs were used for 
the generation of the keystream (section 5.5.1). 
(i) Keystream Sequence 
Longest Runs of Oines Test 
Rank Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) N (number of substrings) = 0 
(b) M (substring length) = 10000 
(c) / ' = - l . # INDOO 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
<=10 11 12 13 14 15>=16 P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000000 SUCCESS 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) Probability P32 = 0.288788 
(b) P31 = 0.577576 
(c) P3o = 0.133636 
(d) Frequency F32 = 0 
(e) F3,=0 
(f) F30 = 1 
(g) Number of matrices = 1 
(h) J - =6.483030 
(i) NOTE: 706 BITS WERE DISCARDED. 
15 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.039105 
FFT TEST 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) Percentile = 93.757225 
(b)N| =811.000000 
(c)No =821.750000 
(d)d =-1.677079 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.093527 
Nonperiodic Templates Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION 
A =0.406250 M = 216 N = 8 m = 9 n=1730 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
Template Wi W2 W3 W4 W5 Wg W7 Wg x^ P_value Assignment Index 
001101011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 44 
001101101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 45 
001101111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 46 
001110101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 47 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
OOlllOIll 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 48 
001111011 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 49 
001111101 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 50 
Overlapping Template of All Ones Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) n (sequence_length) = 1730 
(b) m (block length of 1 s) =9 
(c) M (length of substring) = 1032 
(d) N (number of substrings)= I 
(e) ,1= [(M-m+l)/2n = 2.000000 
(f) T] =1.000000 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
0 1 2 3 4>=5 x^ P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 1 6.109513 0.295708 SUCCESS 
Lempel-Ziv Compression Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) W (number of words) = 221 
(b) Bits Discarded =1730 
SUCCESS P_ value = 1.000000 
(ii) Encrypted Message Sequence 
Frequency Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The nth partial sum = 28 
(b)S__n/n =0.016185 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.500829 
Block Frequency Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) x'' = 9.953757 
(b) Number of substrings = 10 
(c) Block length =173 
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SUCCESS P_value = 0.444560 
Longest Runs of Ones Test 
Rank Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) N (number of substrings) = 0 
(b) M (substring length) = 10000 
(c) X' # INDOO 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
<=10 11 12 13 14 15>=16 P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000000 SUCCESS 
SUCCESS 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) Probability P32 = 0.288788 
(b) P3i= 0.577576 
(c) P3o = 0.133636 
(d) Frequency F32 = 0 
(e) F3, = 0 
(f) F30 = 1 
(g) Number of matrices = 1 
(h) ;^' =6.483030 
(i) NOTE: 706 BITS WERE DISCARDED. 
P value = 0.039105 
Nonperiodic Templates Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION 
^=0.406250 M = 216 N = 8 m = 9 n=1730 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
Template Wi W2 W3 W4 W5 We W7 Wg z^ P_vaiue Assignment Index 
001101011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 44 
001101101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 45 
001101111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 46 
001110101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 47 
001110111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 48 
001111011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 49 
001111101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.237112 0.918608 SUCCESS 50 
Overlapping Template of All Ones Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) n (sequence_length) =1730 
(b)in (block length of Is) =9 
(c) M (length of substring) = 1032 
(d) N (number of substrings)= 1 
(e) /l= [(M-m+l)/2n = 2.000000 
(0 77 =1.000000 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
0 1 2 3 4>-5 x^ P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 1 6.109513 0.295708 SUCCESS 
Lempel-Ziv Compression Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
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(a) W (number of words) = 224 
(b) Bits Discarded =1730 
SUCCESS P_value = 1.000000 
CumuJafive Sums (FORWARD) Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The maximum partial sum = 51 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.439808 
Cumulative Sums (REVERSE) Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The maximum partial sum = 61 
SUCCESS P_ value = 0.284957 
3.0.4 Multichannel Stream Cipher (Technique 2) 
Randomness tests were performed on the keystreams and encrypted data in multichannel 
stream cipher, where modified codes were used for the generation of the keystream. 
(i) Keystream Sequence 
Longest Runs of Ones Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) N (number of substrings) = 0 
(b) M (substring length) = 10000 
(c) X'' =-\. n INDOO 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
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<=10 11 12 13 14 15>=16 P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000000 SUCCESS 
Nonperiodic Templates Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION 
A =2.103516 M=1085 N = 8 m = 9 n = 8680 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
Template Wi W2 W3 W4 W5 We W7 Wg z^ P_value Assignment Index 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 44 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 45 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 46 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 47 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 48 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 49 
0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 50 
001101011 
OOlIOllO 
001101111 
001110101 
001110111 
OOIlllOll 
001111101 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Lempel-Ziv Compression Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) W (number of words) = 580 
(b) Bits Discarded = 8680 
SUCCESS P_value = 1.000000 
(ii) Encrypted Message Sequence 
Frequency Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The nth partial sum = 56 
(b) S_n/n = 0.006452 
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SUCCESS P_value = 0.547790 
Longest Runs of Ones Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) N (number of substrings) = 0 
(b) M (substring length) = 10000 
(c) x^ =-!• # INDOO 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
<=10 11 12 13 14 15>=16 P-value Assignment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.000000 SUCCESS 
Nonperiodic Templates Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION 
A =2.103516 M=I085 N = 8 m = 9 n = 8680 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
Template Wi W2 W3 W4 W5 Wg W7 Wg x^ P_value Assignment Index 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 44 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 45 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 46 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 47 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 48 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 49 
0 0 17.277721 0.027344 SUCCESS 50 
OOlIOlOll 
001101101 
OOlIOlIll 
OOIIlOIOl 
001110111 
001111011 
001111101 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Lempel-Ziv Compression Test 
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COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) W (number of words) = 796 
(b) Bits Discarded = 8680 
SUCCESS P_value = 1.000000 
Cumulative Sums (FORWARD) Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The maximum partial sum = 139 
SUCCESS P_vaiue = 0.271408 
Cumulative Sums (REVERSE) Test 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION: 
(a) The maximum partial sum = 95 
SUCCESS P_value = 0.611321 
Note: In case of nonperiodic templates test P-value is computed for each possible 
template. Most of them give successful results. Few results are given here out of large 
number of template results. 
Some tests were not applicable because of the limitations of the computing machine 
and hence the insufficient number of cycles. These tests are random excursions test, 
random excursions variant test, approximate entropy test and Maurer's "universal 
statistical" test. 
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